

Would adopting more co-governance arrangements with communities build public trust?

WOULD ADOPTING MORE CO-GOVERNANCE ARRANGEMENTS WITH COMMUNITIES BUILD PUBLIC TRUST?

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| A group of people in a room  Description automatically generated with medium confidence | **A scoping study**  April 2023  Ciara Smyth, Shona Bates  Social Policy Research Centre, UNSW |

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# Summary

This scoping study is one component of a larger research project being undertaken by the Social Policy Research Centre (SPRC), UNSW Sydney, funded by the Australia and New Zealand School of Government (ANZSOG) and the NSW Government (the NSW Department of Premier and Cabinet, as well as Customer Service, Regional NSW, and the NSW Public Service Commission). The purpose of this scoping study was to identify methods to methods to operationalise and implement co-governance, including outcomes of co-governance.

This report presents the findings of the scoping study and is informed by a search of the literature (both academic and practice). The focus was on identifying widely applicable principles that can be applied to different contexts. Illustrative examples of co-governance in specific jurisdictions and policy areas are included.

## Definitions of co-governance/collaborative governance

The literature refers mainly to ‘collaborative governance’ which is used interchangeably with co-governance. The most frequently cited definitions of ‘collaborative governance’ identified for in review are those of Ansell and Gash (2008) and Emerson (2012). These definitions emphasise collective decision-making, formal arrangements, deliberative and constructive processes, and the involvement of government and other stakeholders, including community members, as components of collaborative governance.

Collaborative governance is on a continuum of ‘co’ activities which governments are involved in, including consultation, collaboration, co-design and co-production. In terms of the degree of power and authority given to non-government actors, collaborative governance is not at the end of the continuum. Devolution, self-determination and autonomy are further along this continuum. The IAP2 Public Participation Spectrum[[1]](#footnote-2) is an often-used framework that outlines different models or levels of participation across a spectrum – inform, consult, involve, collaborate, empower – all suited to different goals, resources, time frames and decision-making focus. This spectrum recognises that different processes have different outcomes. *The Australian Public Service Framework for Engagement and Participation* (Australian Government, 2020) guides the Australian Public Service in how it engages with the public. The Framework establishes key principles for engagement and participation (listening, being genuine, and being open) across four different ways to engage (sharing, consulting, deliberating, and collaborating); however, the focus is on collaborating rather than collaborative governance per se.

In summary, it is important to differentiate between collaborative governance and other ‘co-’ activities. Collaborative governance involves sharing power between the public sector and civil society, recognising that power comes in various forms (such as decision-making, resources, information and knowledge), and participants recognise the process as collaborative governance. However, the real power often lies in the decision-making around the rules of engagement rather than on the substance of the decisions themselves. In addition, there is also a continuum of collaborative arrangements from informal networks to the creation of formal governance entities.

## Key findings of the review

The review highlighted that a range of elements across each of the four stages of collaborative governance will be required to establish effective collaborative governance and their configuration is likely to vary based on the context, policy objective, preconditions, and time and resources available. The key stages and the element that make up each stage, including any barriers identified, are summarised below.

**Identifying when collaborative governance may be beneficial**

The review identified several reasons why collaborative governance arrangements may be adopted and the preconditions required.

While there is a growing appetite for collaborative governance and co-creation, the literature suggests that it may be better suited to addressing some policy issues more than others. Therefore, it is important to identify why and how collaborative governance arrangements are initiated and how they develop and evolve. There are two fundamental rationales for collaborative governance: instrumental and ethical. From an instrumental perspective, collaborative governance should be implemented in circumstances where it is likely to produce better policy outcomes or support policy implementation more effectively than without the arrangement being in place. From an ethical perspective, collaborative governance should be implemented when it is considered appropriate for communities to have the power over policy development and implementation.

The review also found collaborative governance initiatives:

* Can be in response to external drivers (any party, not just government) or policy
* Are specific to a problem and objectives (e.g. to redress power, resource, information asymmetry; to solve ‘wicked’ problems)
* Require delegated authority that allows capacity for action
* Require powerful sponsors or champions.

Barriers to adopting collaborative governance arrangements stem from the lack of willingness of parties to engage or lack of the preconditions for effective collaborative governance.

**Establishing the collaborative governance arrangement**

The review identified several considerations when establishing the collaborative governance arrangement in relation to the institutional design, composition and leadership. This includes:

* Understanding the system context and the collaboration dynamics
* Ensuring the group has the authority to act, and there is senior and middle management support
* Designing a formal (visible), credible and independent governance mechanism – with clear and transparent roles, processes, tools and structures around decision-making
* Including actors from civil society affected by the initiative in the governance – alongside other organisational actors
* Appointing a clear, independent and skilled leader that instils trust and supports contributions, facilitating collaboration
* Establishing mechanisms that enable the group to have the capacity to act, through procedural and institutional arrangements, leadership, knowledge and resources
* Providing a realistic timeframe to establish and implement the arrangement.

Barriers to establishing effective collaborative governance arrangements include the lack of leadership, representation, engagement, supporting programs, and continuity of members.

**Implementing collaborative governance**

Once an agreement is established, the review found different actions are required at the strategic and operational level to ensure the arrangement is implemented and is effective.

At the strategic level, this involves:

* Ensuring there is a joint understanding and commitment to the goals and scope (including accountability and desired outcomes)
* Developing mutual understanding, respect and trust (accepting trust may vary)
* Identifying strategies to build trust, including by learning, sharing information and resources, and being transparent
* Ensuring there is a joint understanding of commonalities and differences between collaborators, including different organisational cultures
* Reflecting on the strengths and weaknesses of arrangement and adapting to changes in the operating environment to sustain the arrangement over the long-term
* Supporting the arrangement to deliver and sustain collective action.

At the operational level (in terms of diagnosis, design, implementation and assessment), this involves:

* Developing a theory of change. This involves a process of discovery, definition, deliberation and determination – leading to a shared theory of change/action or strategy (including measures of success) – fed by, and leading to, trust, understanding, legitimacy and commitment
* Having repeated, face-to-face dialogue and communication, leading to trust-building, commitment to process, and a shared understanding
* Having support from an intermediary (backbone support organisation), which is able to coordinate reinforcing activities across organisations
* Developing additional processes, such as co-creation, to drive innovative outcomes
* Establishing an accountable evaluation system that tracks inputs, processes and outcomes, and provides assurance back to bureaucracies
* Communicating accomplishments as early as possible.

The key barriers identified to implementing collaborative governance arrangements relate to the lack of time and resources, lack of trust, limitations of consensus building, particularly for contentious issues, being reactive rather than proactive, lacking in focus, or having difficulty in addressing complex issues.

**Identifying and reporting outcomes from collaborative governance**

The review showed the range of potential outcomes of collaborative governance can be varied, intentional, unintentional, measurable, unmeasurable, positive, negative, short-term and long-term. Ultimately, the test of whether collaborative governance is successful and increases public value is whether it achieves better policies or programs than would have been the case if decisions had been made by government on its own. However, this is difficult to determine given there is rarely a counter-factual or benchmark. Outcomes from specific actions include:

* Strategic plans and theories of change/action agreed
* Short, medium and long-term outcomes ‘on the ground’ that have occurred due to the collaborative arrangement (intentional or otherwise).

Collaborative governance can also have other outcomes related to the process of collaboration. The process may redress power, information and resource imbalances. The process may result in improved relationships, understanding and accountability and increase trust in the government or service system, and willingness to engage in future collaborative exercises between communities and government and with different services or sectors.

Notably, the absence of outcomes, or reporting of outcomes may affect continuity of the arrangement.

## Other considerations

**Cultural considerations**

There has been a growing recognition of the need to engage with First Nations peoples and Indigenous knowledge to manage the natural environment, particularly evident in Canada, New Zealand and Australia in recent years. Meaningful engagement with First Nations communities requires significant effort in the early stages of design. Local peoples’ cultural and social perspectives should be incorporated at all stages of collaborative governance and inform activities and objectives.

**Trust and collaborative governance**

The issue of trust features frequently in the collaborative governance literature and is recognised as critical to initiating and sustaining collaborative governance arrangements. While trust may facilitate a collaborative governance arrangement; the absence of trust may also be a reason collaborative governance is needed.

The review identified different ways of considering trust including trust in individuals (where individuals build trust through behaviour), interpersonal trust (between two parties) and institutional trust (which may influence and shaping others behaviour). Other typologies of trust and ways to measure trust are included in the review. Trust can also be considered in terms of mistrust in either an individual, between two or more parties, or of an institution.

In the context of collaborative governance, trust may involve the individuals engaged in the process, as well as the institutions and community affected by the collaboration, as indicated by the figure below.

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Ideally collaborative governance would result in greater levels of trust not only in the specific individuals or sectors involved, but also in government and in the community. Trust is also reciprocal – collaborative governance can increase governments’ trust in communities’ ability to collaborate and address difficult policy challenges.

**Examples of collaborative governance toolkits**

While there are examples of collaborative governance toolkits available, it is unclear the extent to which they have been tried or tested in Australia and New Zealand, or whether further guidance is required to operationalise collaborative governance locally.

## Implications

The review indicates that much of the literature to date has been written from the perspective of the public sector rather than civil society. The literature does not provide evidence relating to the extent collaborative governance arrangements have been initiated by the community and to what extent they should or could be. There is therefore an opportunity to provide clearer guidance to both the public sector and civil society about what collaborative governance is (and is not), where it is most useful, and to provide insights when negotiating collaborative governance arrangements to ensure they address issues of power imbalance (including information, knowledge and skills), resourcing and trust.

There are also concerns that collaborative governance occurs on a spectrum of co-activities (from top-down decisions, consultation, collaboration, collaborative governance to self-determination). There is scope to develop a broader understanding of what collaborative governance might look like within that spectrum, to ensure trust is not eroded in making collaborative governance out to be something it is not. For example, collaborative governance could be seen by some stakeholders as a step towards self-determination, while others see it as an end in itself. It is not clear whether universal measures or principles of accountability may apply to all collaborative governance arrangements, or if they need to be developed on a case-by-case basis.

In summary the available literature indicates that declining trust in government, policy failures, and the intractability of wicked problems signal an urgent need for policy innovation which has fostered a growing interest in collaborative governance. Collaborative governance is an attractive proposition because, in theory, it involves all stakeholders affected by an issue coming together to engage in creative problem-solving. The literature includes a range of examples of successful and unsuccessful collaborative governance arrangements, and provides some indications of the conditions under which collaborative governance is likely to be successful. However, the specific contexts in which collaborative governance is implemented are crucially important and must be taken into account in each collaborative governance process. Collaborative governance has the potential to improve policy decision making and can also lead to broader positive outcomes including increased levels of trust. However, there is always a risk involved in undertaking a collaborative governance approach to addressing policy challenges, and if the process is unsuccessful this can lead to lower levels of trust.

# Introduction

This scoping study is one component of a larger research project being undertaken by the Social Policy Research Centre (SPRC), UNSW Sydney, funded by the Australia and New Zealand School of Government (ANZSOG) and the NSW Government (the NSW Department of Premier and Cabinet, as well as Customer Service, Regional NSW and the NSW Public Service Commission).

The purpose of this scoping study was to identify:

1. Methods to operationalise and implement co-governance
2. Outcomes of co-governance.

This report presents the findings of the scoping study and is informed by a search of the literature (both academic and practice). The focus was on identifying widely applicable principles that can be applied to different jurisdictional and policy contexts. However, illustrative examples of co-governance practices and evidence of their application in specific jurisdictions and policy areas are also included.

A key point to note at the outset is that although the ANZSOG project specifications use the term ‘co-governance’, the term is rarely used in the literature – the term ‘collaborative governance’ is more common. Following the literature, this review mainly uses the term *collaborative governance*, which is considered synonymous with co-governance; however, the terms are used interchangeably.

The findings are organised as follows:

* Section 3 provides a definition of collaborative governance
* Section 4 describes the drivers for adopting collaborative governance
* Section 5 presents the methods for operationalising and implementing collaborative governance identified in the review – including facilitators and barriers
* Section 6 identifies the expected outcomes of collaborative governance
* Section 7 provides some insights in terms of cultural considerations
* Section 8 describes methods used to measure trust in collaborative governance
* Section 9 Provides examples of collaborative governance toolkits
* Section 10 discusses the implications of the findings for the remainder of this study.

This report is supported by three appendices. Appendix A describes the approach adopted to identify and analyse the relevant literature. Appendix B provides examples of collaborative governance reported in the literature. Finally, Appendix C summarises examples of principles or toolkits.

# Definition of collaborative governance

Interest in collaborative governance has grown in recent years as societies contend with declining trust in government, policy failures and entrenched ‘wicked problems’ that appear to defy solution (Boyle et al., 2021; Osborne et al., 2021; Torfing and Ansell, 2017; Wagenaar, 2017). There is growing recognition that some policy problems are too big for policy makers to address alone and that policies are likely to be ineffective if they fail to address the needs, interests and concerns of people directly affected by the policy. Further, international law and policy require greater collaboration between government and society in policy development.[[2]](#footnote-3) In this context, collaborative governance has emerged as “a new paradigm in public administration” and “a new way of doing the business of government” (Emerson et al. 2012). In contrast to traditional top-down decision making or consultation, collaborative governance seeks to bring together affected stakeholders to develop consensus-based policy.[[3]](#footnote-4) It involves government and non-government actors coming together to explore possibilities and develop creative, effective policy responses.

The most frequently cited definitions of ‘collaborative governance’ that featured in the literature identified for this review are those of Ansell and Gash (2008) and Emerson (2012):

A governing arrangement where one or more public agencies directly engage non-state stakeholders in a collective decision-making process that is formal, consensus-oriented, and deliberative and that aims to make or implement public policy or manage public programs or assets. (Ansell and Gash, 2008: 544)

We define collaborative governance broadly as the processes and structures of public policy decision making and management that engage people constructively across the boundaries of public agencies, levels of government, and/or the public, private and civic spheres in order to carry out a public purpose that could not otherwise be accomplished. (Emerson et al. 2012: 2)

Given that an aim of this research is to understand whether co-governance contributes to building trust in the public sector in communities, we start with the definition proposed by Ansell and Gash (2008), recognising that power (and its various associations such as resources, knowledge, access, decision-making and control) is implied rather than explicit in their definition.

While the focus of this study is on co-governance, we recognise that this may often be confused with other ‘co-’ activities – that is a range of participatory and consultatory activities – governments can undertake along a continuum to engage with citizens and civil society in policy development and decision-making. Co-governance is towards one end of this continuum and requires partners to be engaged in the decision-making process itself, not just provide views or ideas – such as through consultation. However, it is not the end of the continuum, as indicated below, as it does not devolve decision-making to stakeholder groups or communities and is not a form of self-determination.

The literature also discusses the need for *co-creation* in public policy. Torfing et al. (2021:193) define co-creation as ‘the process through which two or more public and private actors collaborate – ideally on an equal footing – to define problems and designing and implementing new and better solutions’, adding that it may facilitate ‘mutual and transformative learning that spurs innovation’. They assert that collaborative governance usually involves organised stakeholders and is less concerned with innovation, whereas co-creation can foster “innovative solutions to complex problems” (2021: 190). In championing co-creation over collaborative governance, they assert that co-creation is “less elitist… less preoccupied with interest mediation, … less agency-centric and more distributive, as both the initiation and leadership of collaboration may be a joint endeavour” (2021: 192).

Noting that the EU, the OECD, the World Bank, and the UN support the co-creation of public policy solutions, Torfing et al. (2021) offer additional arguments for engaging in co-creation (arguments that would apply equally to collaborative governance). For example, where:

* limited financial resources make it difficult for the public sector to provide sufficient services to address pressing social issues
* there are many pressing social issues that the public sector cannot address alone due to lack of reach
* the complex and fragmented nature of the public sector (administrative silos, multiple agencies at different levels and in different jurisdictions, multiple actors from the economy and civil society) calls for co-created solutions that benefit from ‘collaborative advantage’
* there is a growing interest in public innovation
* co-creation creates joint ownership over innovative responses, and
* co-creation offers an alternative to the growing distrust of elected politicians and public institutions.

Torfing et al. (2021:196) recognise the ‘close theoretical affinity between co-creation and collaborative governance’, and highlight that collaborative governance focuses on the ‘processes and arenas of public policymaking and management that engage people constructively across the boundaries of public agencies, levels of government, and/or the public, private and civic spheres in order to carry out a public purpose that could not have otherwise been accomplished’. The authors claim that co-creation is a subset of collaborative governance: collaborative governance provides the ‘institutional support for co-creation’, while co-creation defines a specific problem and uses collaboration to find an innovative solution that is considered to ‘disrupt the context in which the problem is identified’ (Torfing et al. 2021:196).

Collaborative governance and co-creation are not the only two ‘co-’ activities organised by government to increase public value. For example, consultation, co-production, and co-design all involve the public sector working with others to improve public value – as do partnerships. Governments recognise the need to ‘shift towards more inclusive decision-making processes’, yet ‘there is a continued scepticism of consultative processes, and little accountability as to whether the stated goal was achieved’ (Davis and Andrew, 2017: 1). Approaches differ in the extent to which end-users are involved in decision-making processes, the types of decisions being made (from policy to product/service design), and what is feasible within government systems (Davis and Andrew, 2017).

The IAP2 Public Participation Spectrum[[4]](#footnote-5) is an often-used framework that outlines different models or levels of participation across a spectrum – inform, consult, involve, collaborate, empower – all suited to different goals, resources, time frames and decision-making focus. This spectrum recognises that different processes have different outcomes. At one end, ‘inform’ and ‘consult’ may provide or obtain information in relation to an area of policy and civil society; however, both processes have limited impact on the decisions made. At the other end of the spectrum, ‘collaborate’ or ‘empower’[[5]](#footnote-6) lead to shared decision-making with civil society or the public making its own decisions. As well as differentiating between different levels of engagement and the different impact civil society has on decisions made, each option on the spectrum also contains a high level ‘promise to the public’ such that the public sector is held accountable for. While identifying five models of participation, IAP2 also provides links to other resources such as the Open Government Partnership Participation and Co-Creation Toolkit[[6]](#footnote-7) – and hence recognise the diversity of mechanisms governments may use to collaborate to increase public value. Davis and Andrew (2017) highlight that while IAP2 may be traced back to Arnstein’s 1967 Ladder of Public Participation (see Table 1 below), they are not neatly aligned; they differ in that IAP2 focuses on the planning how to engage the public in decision-making processes, while Arnstein’s Ladder focuses on the outcomes. The authors suggest the two be used in parallel, that is, considering process and outcomes, and the development of mechanisms to evaluate their execution.

Table 1: Arnstein's Ladder of Citizen Participation

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Level of participation** | **Type of participation** |
| 8. Citizen control |  |
| 7. Delegated Power | Citizen power |
| 6. Partnership |  |
| 5. Placation |  |
| 4. Consultation | Tokenism |
| 3. Informing |  |
| 2. Therapy | Non-participation |
| 1. Manipulation |

Source: replicated from Davis and Andrew (2017: Fig. 2)

Not dissimilar to the IAP2 or Arnstein’s ladder is *The Australian Public Service Framework for Engagement and Participation* (Australian Government, 2020) which guides the Australian Public Service in how it engages with the public. The Framework establishes key principles for engagement and participation (listening, being genuine, and being open) across four different ways to engage (sharing, consulting, deliberating, and collaborating). The Framework specifies the reasons for collaborating and highlights the key features which distinguishes it from other forms of engagement:

In these engagements, **people work with the government to define an issue, develop and deliver proposed solutions**. **Participants share decision-making and implementation of solutions**. …. Government must be willing to trust the process to deliver recommendations it could work with.

Typically, when an engagement is a collaboration the following characteristics are present:

• Like a Deliberate engagement, collaborative engagements also **take a rules-based approach**. **Participants are given an engagement plan that sets boundaries for how far and in what way citizens and/or stakeholders will participate in decision-making**

• The process begins by giving participants an **opportunity to present their views to decision-makers**, provide evidence and arguments in support of them, and reply to opposing views

• Once views have been presented, **participants engage in constructive discussions about the best way to solve the problem, subject to the boundaries and rules set by the plan**

• The participants should assess different options on their merits and adjust their views accordingly

• There needs to be an agreement on government’s role versus the community’s role in implementing and delivering any recommended solutions. This could take the form of an agreed action plan, and

• **The final decision on how to proceed remains with government**.

The promise to the public can take the form of: ‘**We will look to you for advice and innovation in formulating solutions**. **Subject to the boundaries and rules set by the engagement plan, we will incorporate your advice and recommendations into final decisions to the maximum extent possible**. We will need your help to implement the solutions together’. (emphasis added, Australian Government, 2020, p. 16)

The APS Framework definition of collaboration appears to focus more on collaboration than collaborative governance or co-governance. Interestingly, the Framework highlights the need for the government to trust the process.

In summary, it is important to differentiate between collaborative governance and other ‘co-’ activities (co-creation, co-design, consultation, etc.). This includes setting out what is not co-governance and the pre-conditions for co-governance. For example, one differential is that co-governance involves sharing power between the public sector and civil society, recognising that power comes in various forms (such as decision making, resources, information and knowledge). Another potential determinant of whether an arrangement is co-governance is whether stakeholders involved perceive the arrangement to be co-governance based on that sharing of power. A key question concerns the decision-making process about what level of participation/empowerment will be implemented in different cases. Often the real power lies in the decision-making around the rules of engagement rather than on the substance of the decisions themselves.

# Drivers for adopting collaborative governance arrangements

While there is currently enthusiasm for collaborative governance arrangements, Lahat and Sher-Hadar (2020) argue that they can be “cumbersome, costly, difficult to manage, and at times may be problematic from […] democratic and accountability perspectives” (p118). For these reasons, Lahat and Sher-Hadar examine the conditions under which collaborative governance arrangements are beneficial and when they are not. The first concerns *public values* and they note that “some issues have inherent values that are more suitable and relevant to explore in collaborative governance than others” (p123). Drawing on a typology of four categories of administrative and governance values (political, legal, organisational and market), they suggest that issues that encompass *political values* (such as liberty, participation, representation, political responsiveness and equality) and *organisational values* (such as administrative efficiency, specialization and expertise, authority of positions and merit, formalization, organizational loyalty, political neutrality, technocratic and functional rationality) are more amenable to collaborative governance arrangements than issues that encompass *legal values* (such as due process, individual rights and equity) and *market values* (such as cost saving, cost efficiency, productivity, flexibility, innovation and customer services). While this typology is useful for identifying different categories of administrative and governance values and how they might fit with a collaborative governance approach, not all policy issues fall neatly into just one category, with many involving a combination of these values.

Lahat and Sher-Hadar argue that the primary reason political and organisational values are more suited to collaborative governance arrangements is because they “can be more accurately defined or legitimized by a group of people (stakeholders) who can contribute to their articulation, definition, knowledge and legitimization” (p123). The second condition concerns issues that require decisions. Using a typology of decision-making strategies in organisations, they look at whether there is *agreement on the facts of the issue* and whether there is *agreement on the values* at the heart of the policy. As evident in Table 2 below, they suggest that collaborative governance arrangements are appropriate when there is *disagreement* on values (but agreement on facts) and when there is *disagreement* on facts (but agreement on values).

Table 2: Decision-making strategies and their implication for collaborative governance

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Agreement on facts | Disagreement on facts |
| Agreement on values | Traditional government – Traditional centralised government in which collaborative governance is not needed | Knowledge-oriented collaborative governance – Stakeholders engage in learning and knowledge production |
| Disagreement on values | Value-oriented collaborative governance – Stakeholders deliberate on values and priorities | Government in search of decisions – Inspiration/risk taking initiatives no place for collaborative governance |

Source: Lahat and Sher-Hadar (2020)

The third condition concerns the macro conditions at the state level – the policy style and administrative culture. Lahat and Sher-Hadar (2020) assert that “countries that have traditionally collaborated with social actors and have more pluralistic characteristics along with an anticipatory rather than a reactive style will be more comfortable with the idea of collaborative governance” (p128). They suggest that where the context makes it difficult to implement collaborative governance arrangements, a more supportive environment should be created.

While there is a growing appetite for policy innovation involving collaborative governance and co-creation, the literature suggests that it may be better suited to addressing some policy issues than others. Therefore, it is important to identify why and how collaborative governance arrangements are initiated and how they develop and evolve. There are two fundamental rationales for co-governance: instrumental and ethical. From an instrumental perspective, co-governance should be implemented in circumstances where it will produce better policy outcomes or support policy implementation. From an ethical perspective, co-governance should be implemented when it is considered appropriate for communities to have the power over policy development and implementation.

# Methods for operationalising and implementing collaborative governance


An aim of this review was to identify research papers that described methods for operationalising and implementing co-governance. Here we understand o*perationalising co-governance* as how collaborative governance arrangements are conceived and established. This includes considering who initiated the arrangement, why it was initiated, and who was involved in or invited to participate in co-governance (stakeholders). *Implementing co-governance* is understood as the governing structure or supportive framework for co-governance arrangements. This includes considering who is responsible for convening the collaboration, for reporting and communicating actions and outcomes, what form the collaboration takes (in person, online), and policies and procedures that are designed to facilitate collaboration.

This section draws on the theoretical insights provided in the literature. Scholars have identified a range of variables and factors that are considered critical to establishing and sustaining collaborative governance arrangements. Some have developed models or frameworks to show how these different variables and factors are related to and/or influence one another. Although outside the timeframe for this scoping review, two key models/frameworks were frequently referenced in the literature are included in this review – Ansell and Gash (2008) and Emerson et al. (2012)[[7]](#footnote-8) – and are summarised in brief below.

Ansell and Gash’s (2008) model of collaborative governance (Figure 1) aims to distil the “critical variables that will influence whether or not this mode of governance will produce successful collaboration” (2008: 543). The model has four broad variables—starting conditions, institutional design, leadership, and collaborative process, each with their own sub-variables. Ansell and Gash consider the collaborative process as the core of their model and that the starting conditions, institutional design, and leadership variables are “either critical contributions to or context for the collaborative process” (p550).

* The **starting conditions** (power-resource-knowledge asymmetries; incentives for and constraints on participation; and prehistory of cooperation or conflict) “set the basic level of trust, conflict, and social capital that become resources or liabilities during collaboration” (2008: p550).
* **Institutional design** “sets the basic ground rules under which collaboration takes place” (2008: p550) and addresses issues of inclusiveness, transparency and clear ground rules.
* The **collaborative process** is represented as a cyclical, iterative process involving: face-to-face dialogue; trust-building; commitment to process; shared understanding; and achieving intermediate outcomes, with Ansell and Gash emphasising the importance of focussing on the “small wins”.
* The importance of effective **leadership** to facilitate collaboration is highlighted.

Figure 1: A Model of collaborative governance (Ansell and Gash, 2008)

  
Source: Replicated from Ansell and Gash (2008: Fig.1)


Emerson et al. (2012) developed an integrative framework for collaborative governance (Figure 2). It comprises three nested dimensions: the system context, the collaborative governance regime (CGR), and collaboration dynamics. The general system context encompasses “the host of political, legal, socioeconomic, environmental and other influences that affect and are affected by the CGR” (p5). The system context generates opportunities and constraints over the life course of the collaboration and produces the drivers for and the uncertainty that shapes the collaboration.

The collaborative governance regime (CGR) encompasses the collaborative dynamics and collaborative actions. These components together “shape the overall quality and extent to which a CGR is developed and effective” (p6). Collaboration dynamics comprise three interactive components:

* Principled engagement
* Shared motivation, and
* Capacity for joint action.

These three interactive and iterative components produce “collaborative actions or the steps taken in order to implement the shared purpose of the CGR.” (p6). These actions can lead to outcomes within and external to the CGR which can lead to “adaptation (the transformation of a complex situation or issue) both within the system context and the CGR itself” (p6).

Figure 2: Integrative framework for collaborative governance



Source: Replicated from Emerson et al. (2012: Fig. 1)

Emerson and colleagues describe each of these aspects in greater depth, some of which are noted here.

* **Drivers** of collaboration include leadership, consequential incentives (i.e. internal, or external drivers for collaborative action), interdependence (when individuals and organisations are unable to accomplish something on their own), and uncertainty (for ‘wicked problems’ that do not have an obvious solution).
* **Collaborative dynamics** comprise three components
  + - *Principled engagement*: “occurs over time through the iteration of four basic process elements: discovery, definition, deliberation, and determination” (p. 10).
    - *Shared motivation*: consists of four elements: mutual trust, understanding, internal legitimacy, and commitment
    - *Capacity for joint action*: “conceptualized as the combination of four necessary elements: procedural and institutional arrangements, leadership, knowledge, and resources” (p. 14).
* **Collaborative actions:** the goal of collaborations is to achieve outcomes that could not be achieved by a body acting independently and “effective CGRs should provide new mechanisms for collective action” (p. 17).
* **Impacts:** “…we focus the definition of impacts on … the third-order effect of ‘results on the ground’. Impacts result from the actions spurred by collaborative dynamics. Impacts are intentional (and unintentional) changes of state within the system context; they are alterations in a pre-existing or projected condition that has been deemed undesirable or in need of change. Impacts may also include the added value of a new social good or technological innovation developed by collaborative action. Impacts can be physical, environmental, social, economic, and/or political. They can be specific, discrete, and short term or they can be more broadly cast, cumulative in nature, and with longer term impacts. The former is much easier to measure and confirm, the latter more challenging to verify and evaluate.” (p. 18).

Emerson et al. (2012) distil their theories into a set of propositions about the dynamic interactions among components of the framework which are listed in Box 1 below.

Box 1 Integrative framework for collaborative governance - propositions

|  |
| --- |
| * 1. One or more of the drivers of leadership, consequential incentives, interdependence, or uncertainty are necessary for a CGR to begin. The more drivers present and recognized by participants, the more likely a CGR will be initiated.   2. Principled engagement is generated and sustained by the interactive processes of discovery, definition, deliberation, and determination. The effectiveness of principled engagement is determined, in part, by the quality of these interactive processes.   3. Repeated, quality interactions through principled engagement will help foster trust, mutual understanding, internal legitimacy, and shared commitment, thereby generating and sustaining shared motivation.   4. Once generated, shared motivation will enhance and help sustain principled engagement and vice versa in a ‘‘virtuous cycle.’’   5. Principled engagement and shared motivation will stimulate the development of institutional arrangements, leadership, knowledge, and resources, thereby generating and sustaining capacity for joint action.   6. The necessary levels for the four elements of capacity for joint action are determined by the CGR’s purpose, shared theory of action, and targeted outcomes.   7. The quality and extent of collaborative dynamics depends on the productive and self-reinforcing interactions among principled engagement, shared motivation, and the capacity for joint action.   8. Collaborative actions are more likely to be implemented if (1) a shared theory of action is identified explicitly among the collaboration partners and (2) the collaborative dynamics function to generate the needed capacity for joint action.   9. The impacts resulting from collaborative action are likely to be closer to the targeted outcomes with fewer unintended negative consequences when they are specified and derived from a shared theory of action during collaborative dynamics.   10. CGRs will be more sustainable over time when they adapt to the nature and level of impacts resulting from their joint actions.   Source: Emerson et al. (2012) |

Issues relating to the operationalisation and implementation of co-governance are frequently discussed in the literature in terms of facilitators of and barriers to co-governance.

## Facilitators of collaborative governance

Facilitators of collaborative governance were noted in the literature on collaborative governance theory and also in the case studies that identified empirically grounded facilitators of effective collaboration.

To highlight examples of successful public governance, Compton and colleagues (2022) established an open access repository of cases of collaborative governance (<https://collaborativegovernancecasedatabase.sites.uu.nl/>). Through analysing these cases, Compton et al. noted factors that facilitated successful collaborative governance arrangements. First, successful policies tend to address a problem that was **well defined and broadly acknowledged** at the outset of the policy development process. Here they give the example of Australia’s Higher Education Contribution Scheme (HECS). Second, **bipartisan support is nurtured** as the proposed policy matures, which allows the policy “to endure across multiple changes in government and take root in the community’s value system and sense of identity” (2022: 51). Here they give the example of New Zealand’s nuclear-free policy. Third, policy actors can **leverage a crisis situation** to push forward with a well-thought out policy change that has been mooted for some time. Here they give the example of gun control legislation introduced following the 1996 Port Arthur massacre in Tasmania, Australia. However, it is questionable whether the examples provided by Compton et al. (2022) fall truly within the definition of collaborative governance offered by Ansell and Gash (2008) due to the extent the community was involved in the decision-making process.

Drawing on the literature, Wagenaar (2017) lists the design requirements for successful collaborative governance as: the **inclusion of allactors** from civil societywho are **affected** by the policy are involved in the governing arrangement; the collaborative arrangement needs to be **authoritative** (i.e. have a mandate for decision-making); the collaborative arrangement must have a **formal** character; and participants in the collaborative arrangements must be willing to engage in “authentic dialogue” (see Table 20 in Appendix B for more detail on Wagenaar’s case study).

Osborne et al. (2021) describe a regional partnership agreement between the Sunshine Coast Council (SCC) and the University of the Sunshine Coast (USC) to assist the SCC to “embed a culture of excellence in [community] engagement” in projects focused on the social, economic and environmental interests of the region. They note the elements of good government-community engagement reported in the literature and some factors that support it. These include: **long-term vision and commitment**; builds **shared value through co-design**; **links community perspectives to decision-making**; **builds relationships and trust**; **builds resilience**; **inclusive and multi-stakeholder driven**; leverages **partnerships**; builds an **excellence in engagement** culture; **innovative, scalable and transformative**; **measurable and effective**. Osborne et al. (2021) do not report any outcomes from their case study but report that these elements of good practice in government-community engagement are being tested through collaborative governance.

Boyle et al. (2021) describe participants’ experiences of being involved in a policy forum, An Fóram Uisce (The Water Forum), an Irish statutory body aimed at formally engaging stakeholders in policy deliberation at the national level (see Table 17 in Appendix B). The forum was established in 2018 as a statutory body to facilitate stakeholder engagement in water quality issues. It comprises 26 members representing a range of stakeholder interests. The forum is supported by several full-time staff including a senior executive officer, a research officer, a communications and education officer and a clerical officer. Two standing committees were established to manage the workload. Boyle et al.’s study identified several **strengths** of the Forum:

* It represents a **broad range of interests**
* It is regarded as an important forum for **mutual learning and information sharing**
* The fact that it is a statutory body was perceived at giving the forum **credibility** and provides a means for government departments and agencies to gain access to stakeholder views, both formally and informally.
* The forum’s **independence** was considered important
* Having an **independent chair** not linked to any particular interest group was regarded as important.
* The forum’s role in **building an evidence base** was regarded as a positive development.

Grootjans and colleagues’ (2022) study examined collaborative governance *at the start* of an integrated community approach aiming to improve population health, quality of care, controlling health care costs and improving professional work satisfaction. The case study focused on four deprived neighbourhoods in the Dutch city of Maastricht. The rationale for focusing on the start of the collaboration was to identify factors that hamper or support collaboration from the start as this could affect the longer-term viability of the collaboration. Drawing on several qualitative methods (50 observations, 24 interviews and 50 document reviews), they found that **shared goalsetting**, **transparency, being physically present, informal meetings, trust and leadership** were critical elements at the start of collaborative governance projects. They found that an extensive accountability structure can be helpful for keeping everybody on board but that it can also be time-consuming which can hinder innovation.

Clarke (2017) compared two collaborative governance projects in Colorado, USA, with a primary focus on the projects’ governance model: a state-centric model and a society-centred model (see Table 18 and Table 19 in Appendix B). In the former, “local officials are central to negotiating, initiating, and funding collaborative arrangements. They have the authority to deliberate, to reach consensus, to arbitrate conflicts, to set rules, and to commit state power, authority, and resources to joint action; in the absence of these acts, state-centric collaboratives would not exist” (2017: 580). Despite these favourable conditions, Clarke notes that local officials’ actions and decisions are often contested and debated and that they operate within significant contextual (e.g. organisational and funding) constraints. Society-centred models of collaboration involve civil society actors who come together to address social issues collectively. They can include government agencies and businesses but are usually initiated by civil society actors. Clarke emphasises that her goal is not to champion one model over the other, but rather to identify the factors that contribute to their “**collaborative resilience**”. She notes that in this regard **four elements** are **critical** and “provide a framework for understanding strengths and weaknesses within and between collaborative strategies at early stages” (2017: 585):

* the **initial effort**s to develop a **common agenda** and **shared vision for change**
* the presence and **role** of **intermediaries** or backbone **support organisations**
* **coordination strategies** for mutually reinforcing **activities** across **political scales**, and
* **integration** with **multilevel governance structures**. (emphasis added; Clarke, 2017: 585)

Table 3: Framework for understanding strengths and weaknesses within and between collaborative strategies in the early stages

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Shared Vision/ Agenda** | **Backbone Organisation + Leadership** | **Coordination strategies** | **Multi-level Integration** |
| FasTracks | Voter Approved then defection threats | Regional Transit District Authority: Public Authority | Dynamic scaling | Increasingly vertically and horizontally integrated |
| Children’s Corridor | Consensual but funder priorities shift | Piton Foundation: Family foundation | Indirect | Localised |

Source: Replicated from Clarke (2017: Fig.1)

Drawing on her two case studies, Clarke highlights how they differed on these four elements. She attributes the success of the state-centric collaborative (FasTracks) to its **ability to “bridge the collaborative divide” by engaging in ‘dynamic scaling’** to accommodate multiple governance challenges. She describes place-based, cross-sector local collaboratives as being “at the interface of hierarchy and collaboration, yet this interface often constitutes a gap or “divide” that must be bridged for collaborative governance to be effective (Conrad 2015)” (2017: 591).

Pierre et al.’s (2020) case study of a collaborative governance arrangement (see Table 23 in Appendix B) identified several factors that facilitated collaboration, including **information- and resource-sharing, consistent meetings, and continuous communication**. Benefits of collaboration included building relationships, increased access to resources, and increased reach and access to community members.

The literature also points to how the COVID-19 pandemic spurred the need for collaborative governance approaches. The unprecedented nature of the health crisis meant that many public administrations were scrambling to provide a comprehensive response, particularly during the early stages of the pandemic (Criado and Guevara-Gómez, 2021). Drawing on their case studies (see Table 21 and Table 22 in Appendix B), they identify the key features of collaborative governance that guided open innovation initiatives in the Spanish public sector during the COVID-19 crisis. The **use of technology** was essential to implement the initiatives; the initiatives benefitted from the **diversity of collaborators** involved; and **public officials’ personal leadership** made the design and implementation of the initiatives become a reality.

Scott and Thomas (2017) developed 20 propositions they suggest influence **policy makers’** **choice to engage in collaborative governance** to achieve desired policy goals. They include:

* Where a decision has been made to engage collaboratively across government
* Where collaborative governance provides an opportunity to increase legitimacy through either engagement with other stakeholders or directly with end users
* Where action is beyond the scope of the policy maker – either due to geographic scale, reach, policy domain, capacity, knowledge of a particular population, skills or resources
* Where there is greater efficiency through collaboration and this efficiency exceeds cost of collaboration
* Where there is greater effectiveness through collaboration, including overcoming operational constraints, and reducing the points of contact for end users and colleagues
* Where there is opportunity to leverage their central position.

These propositions could also be considered in terms of active (e.g. seeking opportunities to grow, or opportunities to manage relationships and redress power) or passive drivers (e.g. regulated requirement) of collaboration.

Finally, Butcher et al. (2019) examine five examples of collaboration in Australia and New Zealand and identify the attributes of effective collaboration as evidenced in those case studies. In addition to findings from the extant literature on characteristics of successful collaborations, they highlight the importance of: (1) designing the collaboration to address the specific problem; (2) senior managers allowing collaboration to work (understood, supported and authorised); (3) providing policy and operational tools that support collaboration (potentially outside cultural norms of government); (4) understanding the relationship between and culture of collaborators; (5) communicating with bureaucracies to provide assurance; (6) gaining buy-in from middle managers; (7) having realistic timelines; (8) demonstrating early impact; and (9) sustaining the collaboration over a long period. Importantly Butcher et al. (2019:85) recognise that collaboration occurs in dynamic environments where there are ‘multiple logics at play’; and while collaborations may have components in common, they need to be unique to respond to the specific problem and may not be suited to every problem.

## Barriers to collaborative governance

Barriers to collaborative governance were noted in the literature on collaborative governance theory and also in the case studies that identified empirically grounded barriers to effective collaboration.

Torfing and Ansell (2017) identify five barriers to collaborative governance from a policymaker’s perspective:

1. “The classical democratic self-perception of **politicians as the ‘elected representatives of the people’**” who expect to use their skills and power to find solutions to problems ‘for the people”, rather than include them in complex decision-making.
2. I**deologically driven politicians** who are unwilling to engage in open and collaborative decision-making.
3. **Competition within and between political parties**.
4. The unwillingness of politicians to accept the **risks associated with policy innovation** that often arises from collaborative efforts.
5. The **scarcity of time and resources** that politicians have to engage in collaborative decision-making.

The papers in scope of the review that presented case studies identified several empirically grounded barriers to effective collaboration that were context-specific but often replicated across case studies, particularly the importance of trust in collaborative governance arrangements. Che and Hickey’s (2021) study examined the potential for collaborative governance approaches to support Cumulative Effects Assessment (CEA) in the Cree territory of Eeyou Istchee, Northern Quebec, Canada.[[8]](#footnote-9) They found that stakeholders supported adopting a collaborative approach to improving environmental conditions and generating long-term data on wildlife populations. However, they identified several barriers that would need to be addressed before sustainable collaborative governance arrangements could be established. These included an **absence of essential supporting programs** (land-use plans, regional environmental frameworks, lead monitoring agencies, designated funding) and **high levels of distrust** between proponents and NGOs. They conclude by emphasising **the need for leadership** “to facilitate reciprocal knowledge flows among actors, build trust and enable long-term cooperative structures based on a shared vision and goal congruency”.

Boyle et al.’s (2021) analysis of a policy forum, An Fóram Uisce (The Water Forum) described in Section 5.1 above, identified several limitations of the arrangement, including:

* The forum’s **limited impact** to date left some members concerned that it could potentially “be seen as merely a talking shop and a tick-box exercise”.
* The **emphasis on consensus-building**, while regarded as positive, was also considered as **potentially limiting** the focus on more contentious issues.
* Concern that the forum was **more reactive than proactive**.
* Concern about a **lack of representation** in the forum’s membership (“preponderance of white, middle-aged men… only one education representative … [no] young people, aquaculture or commercial fisheries, and artisanal food suppliers”).
* Concern that “**membership** could get **‘stale’** if the same people are retained for too long.”
* Some **members** were **more vocal** than others.
* The **time commitment** required of members, was challenging for some members.
* Concerns the forum’s **brief** was **too broad.**


Pierre et al.’s (2020) case study of a collaborative governance arrangement (see Table 23, Appendix B) identified several challenges of collaboration including difficulty building community **trust**, insufficient advertisement of services, and navigation of government bureaucracy.

Davies and Procter (2020) examine the potential of **digital platforms** for enabling greater citizen participation in policy and decision making. Preliminary findings from their research “suggest that to be successful platforms must take on a form of **deliberative democracy**, allowing for knowledge co-production and the emergence of collective intelligence” (2020: 746). They emphasise the need to ensure that deliberative democracy is enacted at a **crowd scale** to ensure access to a greater **diversity of ideas**, greater **creativity** and the production of **high-quality results**.

In this sense a true form of citizen participation should be seen as a collective feedback loop or a form of dialogical communication at a crowd scale. Through the ongoing process of collective observing, listening, engaging, re-engaging, deliberating, evaluating, revising and adjusting through multiple stakeholders the online platform would utilise the crowd’s ‘collective intelligence’ in a form of knowledge co-production. (Davies & Proctor, 2020: 749)

Their case studies of two online platforms (see Table 24 and Table 25 in Appendix B) identified multiple factors that prevented the initiatives from facilitating true deliberative democracy. Key issues concerned **limited engagement**, a **lack of representation**, **difficulties addressing complex social issues,** and **resourcing**. Based on their analyses, Davies and Procter (2020) developed “a preliminary framework of factors for the emergence and sustainability of collective intelligence at the macro-level” as represented in Figure 3 below.

Figure 3: A preliminary framework of factors for the emergence and sustainability of collective intelligence at the macro-level

  
Source: Replicated from Davies and Procter (2020, Fig.4)

# Outcomes of collaborative governance

Determining the outcomes of collaborative governance arrangements does not appear to be straightforward. The range of potential outcomes can be myriad, varied, intentional, unintentional, measurable, unmeasurable, positive, and negative. Additionally, there is “confusion in the literature about the impacts, effects, outputs, and/or outcomes of collaboration” (Emerson et al., 2012:18). Imperial (2022) draws attention to the dynamic nature of collaborative governance, noting that some arrangements can span decades, which complicates data collection. Rather than focus on terms like ‘success’ or ‘performance’, Imperial favours the concept of a healthy and useful life when examining collaborative governance, noting that such arrangements require nurturing over their life course to sustain them. Conversely, reflecting the form that the collaborative governance takes, others can readily identify markers of success (see also the case study examples in Appendix B for outcomes/impacts emerging from a range of collaborative governance arrangements).

Boyle et al. (2021), for example, assert that “[u]ltimately, the test of any policy forum is the actual effect it has on policy development and implementation.” (p. 51). Drawing on their case study research (see Table 17 in Appendix B), Boyle et al report that in the two and a half years since its establishment, An Fóram made 25 policy submissions; however, interviewees did not know whether these submissions had any influence. While recognising the forum as a positive element of water governance, Boyle et al. state that “a forum such as An Fóram should be seen as complementary to, not a replacement for, wider stakeholder and public engagement initiatives” (2021: 53).

Bartoletti and Faccioli (2020) examined the impact of measures aimed at increasing community engagement and participation (see Table 16 in Appendix B). In 2014, the city of Bologna, Italy, committed to increasing community engagement and collaboration through the enactment of a regulation and developing an administrative tool (the “Collaboration Agreement”). The aim of the regulation was to engage citizens in plans concerning the care and regeneration of urban commons. Citizens could submit their own collaboration proposals or submit a proposal in response to a solicitation from the city. Bartoletti and Faccioli (2020) examined the experiences of citizens involved in collaboration agreements. Between September 2014 and October 2017, 357 agreements were submitted to the city. These agreements fell into four broad areas: care of public spaces (54.1%); care of the vulnerable (25.8%); care of the community (23.5%); and care of culture and education (17.9%). Bartoletti and Faccioli (2020) conducted qualitative interviews with individuals (n=42) involved in civic collaboration agreements concerning the care of green spaces (public gardens, parks, flower beds, school gardens or allotments). Participants’ experiences in collaborative agreements concerning public spaces were overwhelmingly positive. Among the benefits identified were:

...the recognition of the value of the volunteer work, ratified by an institutional document which is the agreement; satisfaction for the appreciation obtained on behalf of other citizens who, even if they do not want to engage directly themselves, confirm the value of the work done by the most active; and the visibility that this tool confers to civic activism promoters and to the activities that they perform. (2020: 1145).

The majority of people interviewed had proposed one or more agreements and had prior experience of civic engagement and volunteering in different social contexts. Being involved in the agreements gave them a better understanding of the problems facing the city “but also of their ability to have a constructive role in seeking out solutions to everyday problems” (2020: 1139). Bartoletti and Faccioli (2020) concede that without Bologna city’s collaboration tool, many of these citizens would nevertheless have been involved in protecting urban commons and green areas. Therefore they suggest that “[t]he policy of civic collaboration, more than activating new participation, appears to have shaped participation… [and] promoted a growth in the institutionalization of grassroots engagement” (2020: 1145).

Wong’s (2022) analysis of the response to COVID-19 in Hong Kong draws on a theoretical framework that combines Political Nexus Triads (PNT) (Moon & Ingraham, 1998) and policy capacity (Wu et al., 2015). Citing Moore and Ingraham, “PNT is defined as: ‘any government action is broadly understood as a product of interactions among policymakers (politicians), bureaucracy and society, who jointly compose the Political Nexus Triads (PNT) and maintain the governance in a nation’ (Moon & Ingraham, 1998, p. 78)” (Wong, 2022: 199). Wong’s study identified failure on the part of the Hong Kong state to respond to the COVID-19 crisis, leaving bureaucrats and civil society to step up to push for official action and share information to tackle the crisis. While emphasising the importance of all three institutions for good governance in order to generate synergies and provide checks and balances, Wong asserts that his study highlights the capacity of the other two institutions – an autonomous bureaucracy and a resilient civil society – to step up to address a major crisis.

# Cultural considerations

There has been a growing recognition of the need to engage with Indigenous people and Indigenous knowledge to manage the natural environment, particularly evident in Canada and Australia in recent years. Water management is a critical issue in Australia not just for production but for Indigenous peoples and culture. Jackson and Nias (2019) have written about the emergence of collaborative partnerships between environmental water managers and Aboriginal communities in the Murray Darling Basin to water country (see Table 13, Table 14 and Table 15 in Appendix B). They highlight the benefits of these collaborative partnerships between Aboriginal organisations and government and non-government water managers for improving the quality of wetlands and “to share more equitably in the benefits from the acquisition and management of environmental water.” (p. 298). These partnerships enable the pooling of resources, including access licences, equipment, funding, administrative skills and knowledge and Aboriginal skills and knowledge of country.

Jackson and colleagues (2019) have also looked at collaborative governance arrangements with Indigenous peoples in remote parts of Australia. As remote communities in Australia are often reliant on governments for essential services and local economic development opportunities, Jackson et al. (2019) note that collaboration is recognised as important for resource planning and management. They apply an adapted typology of Indigenous engagement to twelve water and energy initiatives identified across the Northern Territory, Western Australia, South Australia and Queensland. The four types of engagement are:

* *Agency-driven technical initiatives*: These tend to be focused on achieving agency objectives with limited community involvement.
* *Agency-driven community education initiatives*: These also tend to be focused in achieving agency objectives albeit with more community involvement than agency-driven technical initiatives. Community engagement happens through the provision of information or education targeting behaviour change “which may extend to building capacity of community in relation to water or energy system understanding”.
* *Externally-driven collaborations*: These involve “an expanded focus beyond a typical agency need to incorporate broader community development goals at their core, enabled through community involvement in order to meet design parameters and pre-set objectives.”
* *Community-driven collaborations*: These are “community-led with local Indigenous leadership identifying objectives and priorities in relation to broader livelihoods. Partnership with external organisations to achieve those objectives is a key feature of this type of initiative.”

The twelve initiatives ranged in size and duration with some being small scale projects while others were multi-year, multi-stakeholder, multi-community collaborations. They found that short-term projects posed a challenge for engagement and building relationships. Seven of the 12 initiatives were led by or established by utilities and only one was led by community. Stakeholders recognised the importance of engaging communities in the early stages to discuss the scope, focus, objectives, design and methods to contribute to better outcomes. However, this rarely happened and the lack of early involvement was attributed to “constraints of working within the existing Government agency structures and a culture of top-down management” (2019: 11). Stakeholders also noted a lack of funding to support community engagement as it was not considered “core business for service providers” (2019: 11). Four of the initiatives facilitated community meetings and provided opportunities for “leadership development and training or skills building in relation to water or energy conservation and services.” (2019: 11). Although half of the initiatives referred to capacity building, none described explicit strategies to achieve it. Nine of the 12 initiatives noted the importance of cultural considerations when working with Indigenous communities (such as language, diversity and appropriate methods of community engagement), but “how these were rolled out in practice however, varied considerably” (2019: 13).

The authors conclude that “technocratic approaches to community engagement continue to dominate this space as collaborative processes are constrained by a range of institutional, governance, technical and cultural factors” (2019: 1). They suggest that meaningful engagement with Indigenous communities requires significantly more effort in the early stages of project design and that cultural norms and protocols should not be incorporated “as add-ons”, but local peoples’ cultural and social perspectives should be incorporated at all stages and inform activities and objectives.

# Methods for measuring public trust in a collaborative governance context

The issue of trust features frequently in the collaborative governance literature because it is recognised as critical to initiating and sustaining collaborative governance arrangements (Ansell and Gash, 2008; Emerson et al., 2012; Che and Hickey, 2021; Rapp, 2020). However, only a handful of papers describe methods for *measuring* stakeholder or public trust in the context of collaborative governance.

Hotte and colleagues (2021) tested a **multi-dimensional framework for trust** to explore how trust is created during collaborative governance involving Indigenous communities. They report the findings of a survey (n=51) of representatives of Indigenous and non-Indigenous governments from across Canada with experience in natural resource collaborations. The authors note that legacies of dispossession and racism perpetrated by colonial settlers against Indigenous peoples in Canada have resulted in serious distrust of government bodies and therefore must be addressed in collaborative governance arrangements. Drawing on the literature and other surveys that examined trust, Hotte et al. designed a survey instrument that included items to measure several dimensions of trust. These included items measuring:

* + behavioural trust and distrust when interacting with a collaborator
  + individual, interpersonal and institutional influences on trust
  + experiences of major discrimination
  + trust in institutions
  + trust in a government represented by a collaborator.

Hotte et al. understand trust as “a psychological state experienced by an individual (subjective trust) …that leads to observable behavior (behavioral trust)” (2021: 1299). They refer to **individual influences on trust** that lead people to behave in a more or less trusting manner. Positive influences include a history of positive outcomes from trusting behaviour, while negative influences include experiences of discrimination. They note that “[a]s people become more familiar with one another, **interpersonal influences on trust** become relatively more important than individual influences” (2021: 1299). These interpersonal influences include an individual’s perceived ability, benevolence, and integrity. **Institutions**, both formal and informal, are also **recognised as** **influencing trust and shaping behaviour**. Formal institutions often have ‘formal control systems’, such as policies, procedures, rules for decision-making and conflict resolution, that Hotte et al. suggest can reduce the risk of trusting others. Informal institutions (customs, norms, traditions) “also provide individuals with social cues about what actions are required, prohibited, or permitted” (2021: 1300).

Hotte et al.’s survey was completed by 51 participants involved in collaborations related to the management of parks, marine areas, fisheries, forests, and freshwater. Participants were geographically dispersed across Canada’s provinces and territories. The majority identified as White (63%), a quarter (24%) identified as Indigenous, and 13% identified as Asian, Black, Multiracial or multi-ethnic.

They found that:

* Institutional influences on trust and experiences of major discrimination predicted behavioural trust toward collaborators.
* Individual propensity to trust was not related to experiences of discrimination or behavioural trust.

They note that while positive interpersonal and institutional influences on behavioural trust are important, they may be by overshadowed by the effects of discrimination against Indigenous people. Table 4 below lists the dimensions of trust included in their survey.

Table 4: Dimensions of trust included in survey

| **Construct** | **Description** | **References** | **Published scales available** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Behavioural trust | Intention to accept vulnerability to a trustee based on positive expectations of his or her actions | Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman ([1995](#_bookmark121)), Colquitt, Scott, and LePine ([2007](#_bookmark90)), Gillespie (2003, 2012) | Yes |
| Behavioural distrust | Unwillingness to be vulnerable to the actions of another party | Bijlsma-Frankema, Sitkin, and Weibel ([2015](#_bookmark81)), Kunnel and Quandt ([2016](#_bookmark114)) | No |
| Individual influences on trust | General willingness to trust others, regardless of social and relationship- specific information | Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman ([1995](#_bookmark121)) Frazier, Johnson, and Fainshmidt ([2013](#_bookmark96)) | Yes |
| Individual influences on distrust | The extent to which one displays a consistent tendency to not be willing to depend on general others across a broad spectrum of situations and persons | Greenglass and Julkunen (1989), McKnight and Chervany ([2001](#_bookmark123)) | Yes |
| Experiences of major discrimination | Exposure to discrimination | Williams et al. (1997), Krieger and Sidney ([1996](#_bookmark111)), Krieger et al. ([2005](#_bookmark113)) | Yes |
| Interpersonal influences on trust | Characteristics of another individual that inspire positive expectations on the part of a trustor | McAllister (1995), Cummings and Bromiley (1996), Mayer and Davis ([1999](#_bookmark120)), Colquitt, Scott, and LePine ([2007](#_bookmark90)) | Yes |
| Interpersonal influences on distrust | Negative beliefs about another individual’s motivation and intentions and the expectation that they will behave inappropriately | Bijlsma-Frankema, Sitkin, and Weibel ([2015](#_bookmark81)), Kunnel and Quandt ([2016](#_bookmark114)), Guo et al. (2017) | No |
| Trust in institutions | Willingness of an individual to be vulnerable to the actions of institutions | Inglehart et al. ([2014](#_bookmark109)) | Yes |
| Trust in a government | Characteristics of a government that inspire positive expectations on the part of a trustor | Grimmelikhuijsen and Knies ([2017](#_bookmark103)) | Yes |
| Institutional influences on trust | Characteristics of an institution that inspire positive expectations on the part of a trustor | Ellonen et al. (2008), Thomson et al. (2009) | No |
| Institutional influences on distrust | Beliefs and fears that favourable conditions that are conducive to situational success in a risky endeavour are not in place | McKnight and Chervany ([2001](#_bookmark123)) | No |

Source: Replicated from Hotte et al. (2021: Table A.1)

Rapp (2020) considers the influence of multiple dimensions of trust and the trust environment on collaborative outcomes and how they can be examined empirically. An important caveat is that Rapp’s paper is focused on collaborative natural resource management projects, which may limit the transferability of her proposed approach to other contexts, or it may simply require context-specific modifications.

Rapp presents Stern and Coleman’s (2015) four dimensions of trust (developed for a natural resource management context). She notes that in collaborative governance arrangements, each type of trust can play an important role at different stages in the collaborative process:

* *Dispositional* trust is based on characteristics of the trustor and describes an individual’s propensity to trust.
* *Affinitive* trust … is based on perceived shared values and benevolence and integrity of the trustee.
* *Rational* trust is based on the predicted behaviour of the trustee and the expected utility of trusting them.
* *Procedura*l trust is specific to the “system,” rather than individuals or groups. It is based on beliefs that procedures and rules are fair, transparent, and legitimate.

Rapp asserts that “trust is an important component of shared motivation which helps develop a shared theory of change” (p. 4) and in this context it seems that a shared theory of change is considered to equate with the likelihood of reaching consensus on a course of action. She suggests that the likelihood of collaboration is influenced by the individual trustor’s inclinations and the *type of trust* and the *trust environment.* She states group trust is a component of the trust environment and that it can influence propensity to collaborate and to reach consensus on a course of action. Rapp sets out to test this empirically and proposes the following hypothesis:

*Hypothesis 1:* The relationship between each dimension of individual trust (dispositional, affinitive, rational, and procedural) and the development of a shared theory of change depends on the level of group trust for that dimension: when group trust is higher, the effect of individual trust on perceived shared theory of change is stronger.

Testing this empirically involves developing items to operationalise a range of concepts. First, Rapp considers trust items. Although Stern and Coleman (2015) do not provide items to measure their four dimensions of trust, they draw from the literature which Rapp expands on to develop her proposed trust instrument. Table 5 includes items that aim to operationalise dispositional and affinitive trust.

Table 5: Measures of dispositional and affinitive trust

| **Construct** | **Source** | **Sub-dimension** | **Item** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Dispositional trust | Mayer and Davis, 1999 |  | One should be very cautious with strangers.  Most experts tell the truth about the limits of their knowledge.  Most people can be counted on to do what they say they will do.  These days, you must be alert, or someone is likely to take advantage of you.  Most salespeople are honest in describing their products.  Most repair people will not overcharge people who are ignorant of their specialty.  Most people answer public opinion polls honestly.  Most adults are competent at their jobs. |
| Affinitive trust | Mayer and Davis, 1999 | Benevolence | Other members of this collaboration are very concerned about my welfare.  My needs and desires are very important to other members of this collaboration.  Other members of this collaboration would not knowingly do anything to hurt me.  Other members of this collaboration really look out for what is important to me.  Other members of this collaboration will go out of their way to help me. |
|  | Mayer and Davis, 1999 | Integrity | Other members of this collaboration have a strong sense of justice.  I never have to wonder whether the other members of this collaboration will stick to their word.  Other members of this collaboration try hard to be fair in dealings with others.  Other members’ actions and behaviours are not very consistent.  I like the values of other members of this collaboration.  Sound principles seem to guide the behaviour of other members of this collaboration. |
|  | Siegrist et al., 2000; Vaske et al., 2007 | Salient value similarity | With respect to this collaboration, I feel that other members share similar values as me.  With respect to this collaboration, I feel that other members share similar opinions as me.  With respect to this collaboration, I feel that other members think in a similar was as me.  With respect to this collaboration, I feel that other members take similar actions as I would.  With respect to this collaboration, I feel that other members share similar goals as me. |

Source: Replicated from Rapp (2020; Table 2)

Rapp proposes novel items to measure rational and procedural trust *in a natural resource management collaboration* drawing on her previous work (Table 6).

Table 6: Measures of rational and procedural trust

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Construct** | **Possible item** |
| Rational trust | I can reasonably predict the behaviour of other members of this collaboration.  Other members of this collaboration follow predictable norms of behaviour.  The benefits of relying on other members of this collaboration outweigh the costs.  Other members of this collaboration communicate their intentions clearly. |
| Procedural trust | The rules of the collaboration apply equally to all members.  All members of this collaboration are treated fairly.  The process by which decisions are made in this collaboration is clear and transparent.  The benefits of collaborating are fairly distributed across members of this collaboration. |

Source: Replicated from Rapp (2020; Table 2)

Rapp states that these measures are designed to capture trust at the individual level and that group-level trust “can be measured by combining individual assessments, averaging measures of individual trust to get a single measure of group trust” (2020: 4).

Rapp also considers the level of consensus and agreement on a course of action and desired goals among members of the collaboration effort. She speaks of a shared theory of change which she defines as “the nature and size of the problem or challenge, the possible actions that can be taken, and the goals for the area in question” (2020: 6). To measure whether there is a shared theory of change, Rapp highlights three dimensions for consideration and proposes items for these dimensions: agreement on the nature of the problem; agreement on the actions that can be taken; and agreement on goals (Table 7). She notes that the items “are broad and it is likely items will need to be tailored to the specific collaborative natural resource management project under study” (2020: 6).

Table 7: Measures of shared theory of change

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Dimension of shared theory of change** | **Possible item: Members of this collaboration** |
| Agreement on the nature of the problem | Agree on what it means to restore (location)  Share an understanding of the ecological forces shaping (location)  Share an understanding of the social forces shaping (location)  Share an understanding of the economic forces shaping (location)  Understand the management problems facing (location) |
| Agreement on the actions that can be taken | Agree on how to achieve the ecological goals of (location)  Agree on how to achieve the economic goals of (location)  Agree on how to achieve the social goals of (location)  Agree on what management techniques can be used in (location) |
| Agreement on goals | Have similar goals for the future of (location)  Have similar ecological goals for (location)  Have similar economic goals for (location)  Have similar social goals for (location)  Want the same outcomes for (location) |

Source: Replicated from Rapp (2020; Table 3)

Rapp also advises that other variables should be considered when measuring trust in collaborative arrangements, including whether an individual is in a relatively more or less powerful institution, whether that institution is governmental or non-governmental, whether their institution has sole implementation authority, the age of the collaboration, and how long each individual has been participating.


Another trust measurement tool/study is the Edelman Trust Barometer, a survey conducted annually by Edelman, a [global communications firm](https://www.edelman.com/expertise/financial-communications-capital-markets), since 2001. The 2022 survey included over 36,000 participants from 28 countries and included questions on:

* Trust in government and media
* Governments’ ability to solve societal problems
* Trust in societal leaders (government leaders, journalists, CEOs, citizens of my country, people in my local community, national health authorities, my CEO, my co-workers, scientists)
* Trust in democracies
* Questions about today’s capitalism
* Trust in business
* Involvement of business and NGOs in addressing societal issues.

In 2022, Australia scored 53 on the trust index[[9]](#footnote-10) which was lower than the global average of 56 (for 27 countries), and a decline from 59 in 2021. Note the instrument appears to be very much skewed towards involving non-gov/private actors in addressing social issues.

While there are several mentions of trust in relation to collaborative governance regimes, as highlighted above, few studies seek to measure their impact on trust. This may be for several reasons. Trust may be an antecedent to and/or an outcome of collaborative governance. Trust in itself may be quite subjective and relate to different things (people, process, outcomes). There are multiple relationships and outcomes of collaborative governance (see Figure 4) leading us to ask what aspect of trust are we measuring? In addition, trust is a two-way relationship and very little of the literature discusses trust that government has in the ability of co-governance partners to work effectively with them and make appropriate decisions.

Figure 4: Potential relationships to consider in terms of trust



# Examples of collaborative governance toolkits

The review looked for examples of collaborative governance toolkits that could be applied to multiple contexts (i.e. could be applied to different jurisdictions or policy contexts). The toolkits are also summarised in Appendix C.

Two toolkits that appeared to offer more resources to guide the establishment of collaborative governance arrangements are described here: REFLOW and the Intersector Toolkit.

**REFLOW**: “REFLOW is an EU H2020 funded project that seeks to understand and transform urban material flows, co-create and test regenerative solutions at business, governance, and citizen levels to create a resilient circular economy”.[[10]](#footnote-11) The REFLOW Collaborative Governance Toolkit is available online. The website includes “[a]n open collection of tools and resources to support collaborative journeys towards circular and regenerative cities.”

The website lists several strategic, operational and relational aims under which sit several boxes (see Figure 5 below). Highlighting a strategic, operational or relational aim highlights the boxes that are relevant. For example, clicking on the operational goal *I need to understand governance innovation for scaling up local solutions*, selects two boxes: *Map and visualise circular ecosystem*; and *Matrix of circular collaboration*. Clicking on *Matrix of circular collaboration,* for example, defines what it is, why it should be used, and steps involved. It also includes a link to a document for download that allows the user to add the details of their collaboration.[[11]](#footnote-12)

Figure 5: REFLOW Collaborative Governance Toolkit

Graphical user interface, application

Description automatically generated

**The Intersector Toolkit**: The Aspen Institute, USA, developed The Intersector Toolkit for intersector collaboration, which is available for download (<https://intersector.com/toolkit/.>). The introduction to the toolkit explains that it is intended for individuals working in government, business, and non-profit sectors working in collaborations “characterized by shared decision-making processes among sectors. This type of collaboration is frequently referred to as collaborative governance and can result in joint program or service design and delivery, jointly conceived policies or policy recommendations, and other activities where the resources and expertise of multiple sectors are leveraged in service of a shared vision and where decision-making authority is shared among partners” (p3). The toolkit is intended for use at the very beginning of a project “using it as a resource to support shared understanding of key elements for their collaborative process and a common language for those elements”. The toolkit is designed to be “**process specific, rather than issue or sector specific”**.

The toolkit comprises 17 tools organised into four stages: Diagnosis, Design, Implementation, and Assessment. The steps/tools for each stage are listed in Table 8 below. For each step, the toolkit explains why it matters, provides a case study example, includes questions to guide tool use and an ‘additional resources’ section. Each step is covered in two pages.

The *Establish a governance structure* tool, for example, explains why a clear governance structure is important; a brief discussion paragraph on *Determining what governance structure is the best fit for the collaboration* and *Nurturing equity and inclusion;* a brief case study example; and questions to guide tool use:

* What different governance structures will we consider?  
  How will we determine what type of governance structure is a best fit for our collaboration?
* How will we handle disagreements among partners when establishing a governance structure?
* How will our governance structure ensure equity and inclusivity?
* How will our governance structure address power imbalances?
* What is the relationship between our governance structure and how we have decided to share decision-making authority?
* Will we formalize our governance structure? If so, how?

Additional resources are also listed including links to other tools and documents.

Table 8: The Intersector Toolkit stages and steps

|  |
| --- |
| Diagnosis |
| * Engage potential partners * Share a vision of success * Assess the history of addressing the issue * Account for resources * Establish transparency of viewpoints |
| Design |
| * Build a common fact base * Agree on measures of success * Commit to information sharing * Share discretion * Establish a governance structure * Identify a manager |
| Implementation |
| * Communicate the interdependency of each sector * Demonstrate organizational competency and ability to execute * Manage expectations of process and results * Recruit a powerful sponsor or champion |
| Assessment |
| * Define the intent of the evaluation * Tell the story |

The development of the tool was informed by case studies of collaborative governance, qualitative interviews and literature reviews exploring the theories and practices of collaboration. The reference list does not include any references after 2014.

Additional guides or frameworks are described in Section 3 above – specifically, the IAP2 Framework and the Australian Public Service Framework. However, each providing overarching principles rather than toolkits per se.

Finally, while specific to both a population (Australian First Nations), policy context (children) and governance arrangement (partnership), SNAICC provides a useful online tool for community organisations to audit partnership arrangements they have entered into to ensure they remain healthy and constructive. The online tool[[12]](#footnote-13) encourages organisations to:

* Discuss and reflect on the principles that underpin the partnership
* Map the partnership in the context of the community
* Reflect and on the strengths and weaknesses of the partnership and what needs to be strengthened to achieve its goals.

Core components of the different toolkits are reflected in the summary in Table 9 of the discussion section.

# Implications

Declining trust in government, policy failures, and the intractability of wicked problems signal an urgent need for policy innovation which has fostered a growing interest in collaborative governance. Collaborative governance is an attractive proposition because, in theory, it involves all stakeholders affected by an issue coming together to engage in creative problem-solving. A collaborative governance approach might appeal to policy makers in particular circumstances such as when the policy issue crosses multiple policy domains, is beyond their expertise and competencies, where they would benefit from working with individuals or organisations that are well-regarded in their communities and/or they work at a federal or state level and the issue requires local knowledge and implementation (Scott and Thomas, 2017).

There are many examples of initiatives that claim to be collaborative governance; however, true collaborative governance may be very difficult to achieve. Collaborative governance can be costly, difficult to implement and manage, take a long time to implement, and create accountability challenges. Additionally, not all policy issues are suited to collaborative governance and the policy context may or may not support a collaborative approach (Lahat and Sher-Hadar, 2020).

## What we know

This review highlights key stages and components of collaborative governance that have been identified from the literature – including the drivers and preconditions of co-governance, mechanisms needed to establish co-governance, the process of co-governance, and potential outcomes. Each stage and component are summarised in Table 9.

The review highlights that a range of elements across each of the four stages of co-governance will be required to establish effective collaborative governance and their configuration is likely to vary based on the context, policy objective, preconditions and time and resources available.

While the original objective of the study was to understand whether co-governance arrangements help build public trust in government, it is clear from this review that: trust is only one element of co-governance; trust may be a driver of (either the absence of or existence of), requirement and/or outcome of co-governance arrangements; and there are multiple components to trust and multiple relationships to which trust is potentially relevant.

Table 9: Summary of key stages and elements of collaborative governance

|  | Identifying when collaborative governance may be beneficial | Establishing the collaborative governance arrangement | Implementing collaborative governance | Identifying and reporting outcomes |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Facilitator | * Can be initiated by any party (not just government) * Where benefits of working together higher than working independently (e.g. to address lack of trust or to benefit from trust) g * Where benefit (public value) of collaborations exceeds cost of collaboration (policy outcomes or ethical outcomes) c,g * To respond to external driver or policy g * Are specific to a problem and objectives a (e.g. to redress power, resource, information asymmetry; to solve ‘wicked’ problem f,g) * Require delegated authority a that allows capacity for action * Require powerful sponsors or champions d | * Understand the system context and the collaboration dynamics g * Ensure the group has the authority to act h, and has senior and middle management support a * Design a formal (visible), credible and independent governance mechanism – with clear and transparent roles, processes, tools and structures around decision-making a,f,h,i * Include actors from civil society affected by the initiative g,h,i in the governance – alongside other organisational actors * Appoint a clear, independent i and skilled leader that instils trust and supports contributions, facilitating collaboration a,f,j * Establish mechanisms that enable the group to have the capacity to act, through procedural and institutional arrangements, leadership, knowledge and resources g * Provide a realistic timeframe to establish and implement the arrangement a | Strategic level:   * Ensure a joint understanding and commitment to the goals and scope (including accountability and desired outcomes) a,f * Develop mutual understanding, respect and trust (accepting trust may vary) * Identify strategies to build trust a,f,g, including by learning, sharing information i and resources l, and being transparent j * Ensure there is a joint understanding of commonalities and differences between collaborators, including different organisational cultures a * Reflect on strengths and weaknesses of arrangement e and adapt to changes in operating environment to sustain the arrangement over the long-term a * Supported to deliver and sustain collective action   Operational level (diagnosis, design, implementation and assessment d):   * Develop a theory of change q through a process of discovery, definition, deliberation and determination g,j – leading to action or strategy (including measures of success) – fed by and leading to trust, understanding, legitimacy and commitment d,k * Have repeated, face-to-face dialogue, communication, trust-building, commitment to process, shared understanding f,g,j,l * Have the support of an intermediary (backbone support organisation), and coordination of reinforcing activities across organisations k * Develop additional processes, such as co-creation, to drive innovative outcomes b * Establish an accountable evaluation system that tracks inputs, processes and outcomes, and provides assurance back to bureaucracies a,d * Communicate accomplishments as early as possible a | Outcomes from actions   * Strategic plans and theories of change/action * Short, medium and long-term outcomes ‘on the ground’ that have occurred due to the collaborative arrangement (intentional or otherwise) g   Outcomes from process q   * Increased participation and engagement p * Improved relationships * Improved understanding * Improved accountability * Increased trust * Redressed power, information and resource imbalance |
| Barriers | * No willingness to engage m | * Lack of leadership n * Lack of representation i,o * High turnover of membership i * Limited engagement i,o * Lack of supporting programs n | * Lack of time and resources m,I,o * Lack of trust n,l * Limitations of consensus building, particularly for contentious issues i * Reactive rather than proactive i * Lack of focus i * Difficulty addressing complex issues o | * Lack of outcomes affect continuity i |

a Butcher et al. (2019), b Torfing et al. (2021), c Lahat and Sher-Hadar (2020), d The intersector toolkit (<https://intersector.com/toolkit/.>), e SNAICC, f Ansell and Gash (2008), g Emerson et al. (2012), h Wagenaar (2017), i Boyle et al. (2021), j Grootjans et al. (2022), k Clarke (2017), l Pierre et al. (2020), m Torfing and Ansell (2017), n Che and Hickey (2021), o Davies and Procter (2020), p Bartoletti and Faccioli (2020), q Process identified as important if not more important than the outcomes, NRCoP and ANZSOG ‘Indigenous knowledge, partnerships and shared decision making: Culturally responsive regulation in action’, 28 February 202

## What we don’t know

The review indicates that much of the literature to date has been written from the perspective of the public sector rather than civil society, and there is an opportunity to provide clearer guidance to both the public sector and civil society about what co-governance is (and is not), where it is most useful, and to provide insights when negotiating co-governance arrangements to ensure they address issues of power imbalance (including information, knowledge and skills), resourcing and trust. The literature does not provide evidence relating to the extent co-governance arrangements have been initiated by the community and to what extent they should or could be.

There are also concerns that, similar to co-design, co-governance occurs on a spectrum of co-activities (from top-down decisions, consultation, collaboration, co-governance to self-determination). There is scope to develop a broader understanding of what co-governance might look like within that spectrum, to ensure trust is not eroded in making co-governance out to be something it is not. For example, co-governance could be seen by some stakeholders as a step towards self-determination, while others see it as an end in itself.

It is not clear whether universal measures or principles of accountability may apply to all co-governance arrangements, or if they need to be developed on a case-by-case basis.

## What next?

There is currently little detailed guidance in Australia and New Zealand about how to operationalise collaborative governance – not just from a public sector perspective, but also from the perspective of other stakeholders involved. ANZSOG has commissioned a research project to learn from three existing cases of collaborative governance to develop practice guidelines from the experience of those involved.

Using the stages and elements of co-governance identified in Table 9 above, the next step is to collect evidence from three case studies to develop a more detailed understanding of the process of co-governance from the perspective of both civil society and public sector organisations as to how co-governance works in practice – recognising trust is just one element, and accountability is another. This will include why and how the co-governance arrangements were initiated, and how they have developed and evolved over time. This will consider the extent to which co-governance sought to produce better policy outcomes or whether the objective was for communities to have more power in policy development and implementation.

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# Appendix A: Approach and methods

Given project time and resource constraints, a systematic review of the literature was not feasible. Therefore, the approach adopted was to undertake a scoping study. Arksey and O’Malley (2005) describe four common reasons for undertaking scoping studies: (1) to examine the extent, range and nature of research activity; (2) to determine the value of undertaking a full systematic review; (3) to summarize and disseminate research findings; and (4) to identify research gaps in the existing literature. This scoping study combines elements of (1) and (3); i.e. to examine the extent, range and nature of research on collaborative governance and to summarise the findings of studies of collaborative governance. The scoping study was contained by the timeframe, databases and key words used. The review also contains illustrative examples of policy frameworks and case studies of co-governance in practice.

**Time Frame:** Literature published between 2017–2022. However, a small number of theoretical papers outside this timeframe that were highly cited in the identified literature were included to assist with developing the background section.

**Databases:** Scopus has been used to identify relevant literature, as preliminary searches identified sufficient relevant papers to begin the scoping review. Scopus covers international literature from science, technology, medicine, arts and humanities and social sciences, with approximately 25,000 journals included. The database Analysis and Policy Online (APO) was used to identify relevant practice literature. This was supplemented with a google search to look for examples of toolkits to implement collaborative governance. The review of the academic literature did not identify any references to a collaborative governance toolkit; however, a Google search (“collaborative governance” and toolkit) produced about 79,100 results. These could not be reviewed in any great depth, but a quick scan of the first few pages of results identified some of interest. A closer look at several showed that they were issue/context-specific models (e.g. wildlife conservation, child abuse prevention), and so would not be easily applied to other policy domains. Examples are provided in Appendix B.

**Keywords:** Preliminary searches were conducted using a range of keywords and Boolean operators (AND/OR):

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Keywords | | |
| Governance  Public policy  Government | Collaborat\*ive/ion  Co-design  Co-governance | Trust  Community |

After reviewing the results of the literature searches, and reading through their titles and abstracts, papers that appeared relevant were downloaded for review. A template with the following headings was used for this initial review:

* Study reference and notes
* Policyarea (e.g. environmental, family services)
* Addresses aim: (1) operationalising and implementing collaborative governance, (2) outcomes of collaborative governance, and (3) methods for measuring public trust in the context of co-governance
* Strength of evidence (including qualitative, quantitative, sample size)
* Australian or international.

The articles identified in the literature can be characterised into two broad types: (1) papers that examine the theoretical underpinnings of collaborative governance, and (2) papers that present case studies that were analysed in relation to collaborative governance theory. The first category of papers discusses the range of factors and variables that need to come together in various configurations to establish effective collaborative governance. While these are empirically grounded theories, the papers do not cover their empirical basis.[[13]](#footnote-14) The second category of papers describes the nuts and bolts of various collaborative governance arrangements. These case studies emerge from different countries, cover a range of policy issues (e.g. environmental management, community health, prostitution, direct democracy), include various stakeholder groups, are initiated by public and private bodies, involve different forms of engagement, and achieve different outcomes. Rather than attempt to synthesise this variability, the details of these case studies are included in Appendix B (where sufficient detail was provided in the journal article) with a view to providing insights into how different collaborative arrangements come together and their context-specific variability.

Several other insights from the review process are worth noting:

* The papers covered a range of policy domains including natural resource management, water management, urban development, community health, renewable energy policy, prostitution policy, and local area delivery of social services.
* Several papers explored collaborative governance with First Nations peoples, including case studies of water management in Australia, and environmental management in Canada.
* Several papers focused on digital era governance/digital democracy.
* Most of the papers focused on review aims (1) *operationalizing and implementing co-governance* and (2) *outcomes of co-governance*, with only a few focused on review aim (3) *measuring trust in co-governance arrangements*.
* Several papers note how the COVID-19 pandemic spurred the need for collaborative responses to the health crisis.

# Appendix B: Case studies of collaborative governance arrangements

Table 10: Local Task Committees, Gentofte Municipality, Denmark

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Name | Local Task Committees in Gentofte Municipality |
| Country | Denmark |
| Purpose/policy focus | To improve policy formulation at the local council level through engagement with local citizens and stakeholders |
| Initiator | Gentofte Municipality (local government) |
| Participants/ stakeholders | Local councillors, relevant and affected citizens, local stakeholder organisations |
| Process | The City Council established eight Task Committees each focused on developing collaborative, innovative responses to a pressing local policy issue.  Each committee typically comprised of five politicians and ten citizens/stakeholders.  The City Council defined the remit of each committee and appointed committee members.  Committee members could develop their own plans for meetings and activities and also involve other citizens and stakeholders through a variety of means (e.g. sub-committees, task forces, social media, public hearings).  The Task Committees met on a regular basis over a 3–18-month period “to gather information, define and frame the problem, search for innovative solutions, and discuss their practical and political feasibility.” The Committee would then develop a report that was submitted to the political committee responsible for that particular policy area for consideration. |
| Outcome/impact | The political committee made policy recommendations based on the Task Committee’s report. |
| Reference | Torfing, J. and Ansell, C. (2017). Strengthening political leadership and policy innovation through the expansion of collaborative forms of governance, *Public Management Review*, 19:1, 37-54, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14719037.2016.1200662> |

Table 11: The Venlo Greenport Project, the Netherlands

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Name | The Venlo Greenport Project |
| Country | The Netherlands |
| Purpose/policy focus | To develop a strategy for sustainable regional development (green growth) |
| Initiator | Regional business leaders |
| Participants/ stakeholders | An informal network of regional businesspeople, elected politicians and civil servants was formed with support from local municipalities and government officials. This informal network evolved into a broader and more formal network (the Foundation for Regional Dialogue). It was led by a core group that comprised members appointed by all the participating organisations from the public, for-profit and non-profit sectors. |
| Process | The core group organised meetings and workshops that led to the development of an innovative regional development strategy. It also shaped and supported pilot testing of innovative projects.  The core group was later replaced by a more formal network board to manage the increase in new projects and accompanying monitoring and evaluation activities. This more formal network board consisted of leaders from government, business, education and research.  “Elected politicians did not play a privileged role in the collaborative innovation process” but were important collaborators in the process and provided both funding and legitimacy to the project. |
| Reference | Torfing, J. and Ansell, C. (2017). Strengthening political leadership and policy innovation through the expansion of collaborative forms of governance, *Public Management Review*, 19:1, 37-54, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14719037.2016.1200662> |

Table 12: State-wide citizens’ juries on energy policy, NSW, Australia

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Name | State-wide citizens’ juries on energy policy in New South Wales |
| Country | Australia |
| Purpose/policy focus | Alternative forms of energy generation |
| Initiator | MPs from the NSW Public Accounts Committee |
| Participants/ stakeholders | 54 randomly selected citizens from an urban centre (Sydney) and a rural area (Tamworth) to serve on two concurrent citizens’ juries. |
| Process | The juries met on 4-5 occasions over a 10-week period.  Then they submitted a report to the Public Accounts Committee  The juries’ reports were incorporated into the Public Accounts Committee’s report to parliament. |
| Outcome/impact | Torfing and Ansell (2017) report that studies show that the citizens’ juries’ reports “had a real impact on the MPs’ recommendations to the NSW parliament, however “some of the more controversial proposals were either not addressed or addressed and rejected”. |
| Reference | Torfing, J. and Ansell, C. (2017). Strengthening political leadership and policy innovation through the expansion of collaborative forms of governance, *Public Management Review*, 19:1, 37-54, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14719037.2016.1200662> |

Table 13: Fletchers Creek and Lake, Dareton, NSW, Australia

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Name | Fletchers Creek and Lake, Dareton, NSW |
| Country | Australia |
| Purpose/policy focus | Water management - The Barkindji Maraura Elders Environment Team (BMEET) had been established for some years with Working on Country funding to undertake cultural and natural resource management activities on public land. In 2011, they identified a need for environmental water in Fletchers Creek. |
| Initiator | The former Chair of the Murray Darling Wetlands Working Group (MDWWG) with advice from the Barkindji Maraura Elders |
| Participants/ stakeholders | The Barkindji Maraura Elders Environment Team (BMEET), the Murray Darling Wetlands Working Group, NSW Office of Environment and Heritage, Western Murray Irrigation |
| Process | Limited detail on the process of establishing the collaboration |
| Outcome/impact | Benefits for the environment (water means native food plants, yabbies, trees, emus); cultural benefits: people back on country to camp |
| Reference | Jackson, S. and Nias, D. (2019). Watering country: Aboriginal partnerships with environmental water managers of the Murray–Darling Basin, Australia, *Australasian Journal of Environmental Management*, 26:3, 287-303 |

Table 14: Carrs, Capitts and Bunberoo (CCB) Creeks system, NSW, Australia

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Name | Carrs, Capitts and Bunberoo (CCB) Creeks system, NSW |
| Country | Australia |
| Purpose/policy focus | Water management - to deliver water to the Carrs, Capitts and Bunberoo (CCB) Creeks system and Backwater Lagoon to rejuvenate the threatened River Red Gum and Black Box ecological communities and the associated wetlands. |
| Initiator | The Murray Darling Wetlands Working Group (MDWWG), the Commonwealth Environmental Water Holder (CEWH) (a statutory entity). |
| Participants/ stakeholders | “[A] multi-stakeholder partnership” including MDDWG; CEWH; Barkindji traditional owners, represented by the Ta-Ru Lands Board of Management; NSW National Parks |
| Process | Limited detail on the process of establishing the collaboration |
| Outcome/impact | Not reported, but intended outcomes included environmental rejuvenation and training Barkindji participants in environmental field monitoring techniques |
| Reference | Jackson, S. and Nias, D. (2019). Watering country: Aboriginal partnerships with environmental water managers of the Murray–Darling Basin, Australia, *Australasian Journal of Environmental Management*, 26:3, 287-303 |

Table 15: Lower Murray Wetlands, SA, Australia

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Name | Lower Murray Wetlands, SA |
| Country | Australia |
| Purpose/policy focus | Water management/watering country |
| Initiator | Two Aboriginal organisations that fall under the umbrella of the Ngarrindjeri Regional Authority (NRA) in collaboration with wetland specialists and the CEO of the NFSA identified the sites to be watered. |
| Participants/ stakeholders | The Commonwealth Environmental Water Holder (CEWH), The Nature Foundation SA (NFSA); two Aboriginal organisations that fall under the umbrella of the Ngarrindjeri Regional Authority (NRA) |
| Process | Limited detail on the process of establishing the collaboration.  Raukkan Community Council in collaboration with Ngopamuldi Aboriginal Corporation was contracted to manage the Nature Foundation SA pumps and oversee the large environmental watering events on Aboriginal land.  A Working on Country team undertook monitoring and reporting of environmental responses. |
| Reference | Jackson, S. and Nias, D. (2019). Watering country: Aboriginal partnerships with environmental water managers of the Murray–Darling Basin, Australia, *Australasian Journal of Environmental Management*, 26:3, 287-303 |

Table 16: The care and regeneration of urban commons, Bologna, Italy

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Name | The care and regeneration of urban commons[[14]](#footnote-15), Bologna |
| Country | Italy |
| Purpose/policy focus | The care and regeneration of urban commons |
| Initiator | Bologna City Council |
| Participants/ stakeholders | Bologna City Council, citizens of Bologna |
| Process | In 2014, Bologna City Council approved a Regulation on collaboration between citizens and the administration for the care and regeneration of urban commons. (A English-language version of the policy document is available online, Regulation on Collaboration Between Citizens And The City For The Care And Regeneration Of Urban Commons <http://www.comune.bologna.it/media/files/bolognaregulation.pdf>).  Bologna municipality promptly developed a specific administrative tool, the “Collaboration Agreement”.  Digital engagement: The council also launched a “digital civic platform…aimed at fostering citizen participation within and beyond the framework of the Regulation on urban commons.” |
| Outcome/impact | First collaboration agreement signed on September 2014, and by 31 October 2017, 357 had been submitted.  The implementation of the Regulation encouraged the participation of actors who were not traditionally involved in civic collaboration activities (e.g. non-institutional actors such as individual citizens, informal groups, committees, etc.). The submitted collaboration agreements focused on four key areas: care of public spaces (54.1%); care of the vulnerable (25.8%); care of the community (23.5%); and care of culture and education (17.9%).  “..[T]the experience of collaborative governance provides space for self-organized citizens’ practices and enhances forms of participation based on shared practices and creativity, instead of forms of participation based on discussion such as deliberative arena.” |
| Reference | Bartoletti, R., & Faccioli, F. (2020). Civic Collaboration and Urban Commons. Citizen's Voices on a Public Engagement Experience in an Italian City. *Partecipazione e conflitto*, 13(2), 1132-1151. |

Table 17: An Fóram Uisce (The Water Forum), Ireland

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Name | An Fóram Uisce (The Water Forum) |
| Country | Ireland |
| Purpose/policy focus | To facilitate stakeholder engagement in water quality issues. |
| Initiator | Irish Government |
| Participants/ stakeholders | Stakeholders from agriculture, fisheries, business, trade unions, environmental organisations and Irish Water consumers. |
| Process | An Fóram Uisce was established by statute in 2018.  Comprises 26 members from the different stakeholder groups.  It has a small, full-time support staff, comprising a senior executive officer, a research officer, a communications and education officer and a clerical officer.  Two standing committees were established, covering water services and catchment management to manage the workload. |
| Outcome/impact | Limited evidence to date on impact of An Fóram Uisce on policy development. |
| Reference | Boyle, R., O’Riordan, J., O’Leary, F., & Shannon, L. (2021). Structured, formal engagement of stakeholders in public policy –The case of An Fóram Uisce (The Water Forum). *Administration*, 69(4), 39-55. |

Table 18: The FasTracks initiative, Denver, Colorado

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Name | The FasTracks initiative, Denver, Colorado |
| Country | USA |
| Purpose/policy focus | To develop a regional transit system to address congestion and a weak public/mass transportation system |
| Initiator | Government/public sector agencies |
| Participants/ stakeholders | Initially local government agencies, later, as costs increased, the initiative became more collaborative and more multiscalar, including private lenders and federal and state agencies. |
| Process | Limited detail on process. |
| Outcome/impact | The FasTracks collaborative continued due to the state-centred collaborative’s ability to adapt to pressures and rapidly changing conditions. No detail on the final outcome. |
| Reference | Clarke, S. E. (2017). Local place-based collaborative governance: Comparing state-centric and society-cantered models. *Urban Affairs Review,* 53(3), 578-602. |

Table 19: The Children’s Corridor, Denver, Colorado

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Name | The Children’s Corridor, Denver, Colorado |
| Country | USA |
| Purpose/policy focus | To improve children’s well-being in a targeted area |
| Initiator | The Picton Foundation (NGO, NFP sector) |
| Participants/ stakeholders | The key actors were the Piton Foundation, Mile High United Way, Mayor’s Office of Children and Education, and the Civic Canopy but over 200 practitioners, researchers, leaders, and experts participated in setting common goals and agreeing on leading indicators of success. |
| Process | Limited detail on process |
| Outcome/impact | The Children’s Corridor collaborative faltered. The society-centred collaborative faltered in part due to shifting values within the lead organisation. |
| Reference | Clarke, S. E. (2017). Local place-based collaborative governance: Comparing state-centric and society-centred models. *Urban Affairs Review*, 53(3), 578-602. |

Table 20: Prostitution policy, Rotterdam

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Name | Advisory Commission Prostitution, Rotterdam |
| Country | The Netherlands |
| Purpose/policy focus | To develop policy for the effective and decent regulation of prostitution |
| Initiator | Rotterdam Municipal Council |
| Participants/ stakeholders | The police, the Tax Authority, social work, public health, city administrators, and the Rode Draad, a sex worker advocacy group. |
| Process | The Commission met once a month and its tasks were to formulate policy advice, to design policy solutions, to monitor the situation ‘on the ground’ in the city, and to signal instances of trafficking and exploitation.  The Rode Draad was involved from 1999 to 2008 and received a small subsidy and the use of an office from the city. |
| Outcome/impact | “Almost adventitiously the Commission achieved a considerable amount of policy coordination” |
| Reference | Wagenaar, H. (2017). Why prostitution policy (usually) fails and what to do about it? *Social Sciences*, 6(2), 43. |

Table 21: Frena la Curva (Slow down the Curve), Spain

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Name | Frena la Curva, a collaborative online platform, https://frenalacurva.com/ |
| Country | Spain |
| Purpose/policy focus | To collect ideas about urgent issues from citizens, to transform them into solutions during the COVID-19 crisis. |
| Initiator | Regional government of Aragon, Spain |
| Participants/ stakeholders | Agents from the public sector, the private sector and individuals in a personal capacity. |
| Process | Due to public health restrictions, all work, activities, discussions and decision-making were conducted online, significant use of social media.  This first stage consisted of a website (frenalacurva.com), including a forum to exchange among the users.  A governance structure was established comprising 20 members representing the different types of organisations and actors from the 68 collaborator entities involved with the platform. As the platform evolved, some members established subgroups to coordinate the logistics for each activity.  The decision-making process was open and the institutions offered their specific support when required. |
| Outcome/impact | Citizens were invited to submit proposals and a digital guide of citizen’s ideas was launched (examples included online concerts and activities for children to networks in neighbourhoods helping elderly people with basics).  Two projects presented under the common challenges banner were implemented by the Government of Aragon, involving collaboration across the private sector, public sector, individual volunteers and universities.  Ventanas que unen (connecting windows) provided 566 elderly residents received with tablets and an internet connection.  Libros que Unen (connecting books) distributed 12,000 books to children. |
| Reference | Criado, J. I., & Guevara-Gómez, A. (2021). Public sector, open innovation, and collaborative governance in lockdown times. A research of Spanish cases during the COVID-19 crisis. *Transforming Government: People, Process and Policy*, 15(4), 612-626. |

Table 22: Vence al Virus (Beat the Virus), Spain

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Name | Vence al Virus, hackathon (<https://www.vencealvirus.org/>) |
| Country | Spain |
| Purpose/policy focus | To collect ideas about urgent issues from citizens, to transform them into solutions during the COVID-19 crisis. |
| Initiator | Regional government of Madrid, Spain |
| Participants/ stakeholders | Public sector agencies, citizens, private sector, universities and NGOs. |
| Process | Due to public health restrictions, all work, activities, discussions and decision-making were conducted online. |
| Outcome/impact | The hackathon received 750 project proposals from citizens focussed on three areas: health, community-building and employment and business. From this initial group, 150 final proposals were received and 20 were selected as finalists.  The 20 initiatives were supported by a regional government agency receiving consultancy services, training and support to further develop their proposals, with the expectation that some would be implemented later on. |
| Reference | Criado, J. I., & Guevara-Gómez, A. (2021). Public sector, open innovation, and collaborative governance in lockdown times. A research of Spanish cases during the COVID-19 crisis. *Transforming Government: People, Process and Policy*, 15(4), 612-626. |

Table 23: Neighbourhood Health Action Centres, New York

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| --- | --- |
| Name | Neighbourhood Health Action Centres, New York |
| Country | USA |
| Purpose/policy focus | Improving community health through a place-based model using a three-pronged strategy: co-location of services and a robust referral system; innovation in programs and policies, and community engagement, action and impact. |
| Initiator | New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene |
| Participants/ stakeholders | Government agencies and non-profit organisations. |
| Process | The paper is focused on the first component of the strategy - the co-location of services.  The Department of Health and Mental Hygiene invited Expressions of Interest from non-profit organisations or government entities to be involved in the community health initiative.  Selected organisations were offered spaces in the Department’s underutilised public buildings to provide health-related services.  They were contractually obligated to participate in neighbourhood health planning efforts and work collectively with neighbourhood stakeholders and service providers.  They were also obligated to participate in the Action Centre’s Governance Council, a collective decision-making body, made up of representatives from respective co-located entities, by providing consistent and stable representation at meetings.  Governance Council meetings occurred monthly to plan, coordinate and resolve building operations issues, develop collaborative activities and implement programs to meet local community needs.  Meetings were convened, coordinated and facilitated by the Health Department. |
| Outcome/impact | The paper does not include any data on community health outcomes but concludes that the Governance Council Model supports shared leadership and decision-making; that it can be easily replicated; and that government partners need to undertake internal reform in order to be responsive to shared leadership models. |
| Reference | Pierre, J., Letamendi, C., Sleiter, L., Bailey, Z., Dannefer, R., Shiman, L., ... & Sierra, R. (2020). Building a culture of health at the neighborhood level through Governance Councils. *Journal of Community Health*, 45(4), 871-879. |

Table 24: Decide Madrid online platform

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Name | Decide Madrid online platform (<https://decide.madrid.es/>) |
| Country | Spain |
| Purpose/policy focus | To promote more direct democracy, accountability and transparency in local decision-making. |
| Initiator | The City of Madrid launched the platform in 2015 in response to the anti-austerity demonstrations. |
| Participants/ stakeholders | Open to all citizens in the Madrid municipality. |
| Process | The online platform has four components: proposals and votes, debates, participatory budgeting, and consultations. The paper looks only at the proposals and votes section.  A resident can create a proposal for a new local law which is visible on the platform for 12 months.  During this time other residents can comment on the proposal or cast votes of support.  If the proposal gains approval from 1% of the census population with the right to vote (the equivalent of 27622 supporters) it is positioned at the top of the webpage.  The proposal is then debated for another 45 days before going to a final public vote.  If this is approved, the Council has one month to draw up technical reports on the legality, feasibility and cost of the proposal which are all published on the platform. |
| Outcome/impact | Only 2 out of over 13,000 proposals have ever made it through.  Multiple factors affecting engagement, including:   * Over half of the city’s citizens are aware of the platform, but only 10% are registered users. * Difficult to address complex issues on the platform * High volume of proposals makes it difficult for users to identify issues of interest * Resource issues: the large number of ideas generated by citizens must still be processed by civil servants, placing a strain on staff and IT systems |
| Reference | Davies, J., & Procter, R. (2020, September). Online platforms of public participation: a deliberative democracy or a delusion? In *Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Theory and Practice of Electronic Governance* (pp. 746-753). |

Table 25: Better Reykjavik, online platform

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Name | Better Reykjavik, online platform, (<https://citizens.is/portfolio_page/better_reykjavik/>) |
| Country | Iceland |
| Purpose/policy focus | “Better Reykjavik is a co-creation project of the Citizens Foundation, Reykjavik City, and its citizens that connects them and improves trust and policy.” |
| Initiator | Icelandic Government in 2010 |
| Participants/ stakeholders | Citizens of Reykjavik |
| Process | “Registered users participate by suggesting, debating and rating ideas for improving Reykjavik. Responses are separated in columns, either for or against the idea (which makes it difficult to reply directly to someone you disagree with and also helps to show the multiplicity of views on a subject). Both ideas and comments can be voted on by the online community. At 12:00pm on the last weekday of every month, the 5 most popular ideas are reviewed by Reykjavik City Council. The council’s response is published on the platform.” |
| Outcome/impact | No information on direct outcomes, however similar factors affecting engagement as reported for Decide Madrid in Table 24 above. |
| Reference | Davies, J., & Procter, R. (2020, September). Online platforms of public participation: a deliberative democracy or a delusion? In *Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Theory and Practice of Electronic Governance* (pp. 746-753). |

Practice literature

Table 26: Walking with Communities, Local Area Renewal in Australia

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| --- | --- |
| Name | Walking with Communities: Local Government and Community Responses to Local Area Renewal |
| Country | Australia – Penrith City Council (NSW) and Burnie City Council (TAS) |
| Purpose/policy focus | Study seeks to understand how local government can address place-based renewal by collaborating with communities. The study investigates the use of a collective impact framework in community collaboration initiatives. |
| Initiator | Penrith City Council |
| Participants/ stakeholders | Team Colyton (an extension of the neighbourhood renewal plan, Penrith) and Burnie Works (Burnie) – involve local government, community and local stakeholders – using collective impact and ensuring residents have a decision-making role. |
| Process | Identify conditions for successful collective impact (drawing on Kaania and Kramer, 2011:12) as including:   * a common agenda * shared measurement systems * mutually reinforcing activities * continuous communication * backbone support organisation(s)   While collective impact is a specific approach, it is often enabled through collaborative governance (such as through the backbone organisation) and hence is included here. Collective impact approaches are often used for multi-agency approaches – and do not always involve community representation. However, in this case, the community is involved. |
| Outcome/impact | Report provides conceptual framing of community collaboration initiatives. Key lessons taken from the research are:   * ‘Local governments have a **unique capacity to undertake collaborative work** with local communities since it is designed to serve communities and has a role in shaping and building local areas * Gaining **political support** is necessary to ensure the success of initiatives that involve the community * Local governments and their communities **must establish a way of communicating** that involves residents in a **meaningful** and **legitimate** way * Collaborations that include residents from communities **will take more time** * Collaborations that **include residents are held in high regard by the community**, providing opportunity for government bodies to create value for the public through these initiatives * Projects which include community will benefit from **community leadership training** for those residents involved * Local government-based community workers should seek to **build positive relationships with stakeholders, such as local service providers**. This includes an understanding of how different stakeholder funding cycles and priorities may impact on their ability to engage with collaboration processes * Collaborative tools can be a powerful resource but require a shift in thinking whereby stakeholders move beyond orienting outcomes and goals according to their own individual organisations and focus instead on collective outcomes and impact for all involved’ (emphasis added, Chaffey et al. 2017: 2) |
| Reference | Chaffey, H., Bruce, S and. Woods, R., 2017, *Walking with Communities*, University of Technology Sydney  See also <https://burnieworks.com.au/> (accessed 28 February 2023) |

# Appendix C: Examples of principles or toolkits developed for specific contexts

Table 27: Principles for effectively co-governing natural resources in New Zealand

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| Name | **Principles for effectively co-governing natural resources** |
| Country | New Zealand |
| Purpose/policy focus | Co-governance of natural resources |
| Principles | * Build and maintain a shared understanding of what everyone is trying to achieve. * Build the structures, processes, and understanding about how people will work together. * Involve people who have the right experience and capacity. * Be accountable and transparent about performance, achievements, and challenges. * Plan for financial sustainability and adapt as circumstances change. |
| Lessons | The lessons that could help to achieve successful co-governance are:  1. Develop good relationships.  2. Be prepared to work together, listen and learn from each other, and go the extra mile to understand each other’s perspective and reach compromise where needed.  3. Work out a shared understanding of purpose and check understanding from time to time.  4. Agree how to work together, including deciding what form of governance will work best.  5. Take the time to plan and set up processes.  6. Understand the extent of decision-making powers and clearly define roles and responsibilities.  7. Find people with the right experience and capacity, such as strong leadership skills, and governance or management experience, and who have the time to be involved.  8. Keep the public informed of progress and what is being achieved.  9. Provide assurance that finances are well managed.  10. Plan how the project can be sustained through its lifetime. |
| Reference | NZ Auditor General (2016). *Principles for effectively co-governing natural resources*. <https://oag.parliament.nz/2016/co-governance> |

Table 28: Local Decision Making, NSW Australia

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| Name | **Local Decision Making, Aboriginal Affairs NSW** |
| Country | NSW Australia |
| Purpose/policy focus | Local Decision Making by Aboriginal Communities – part of the broader OCHRE initiative in NSW |
| Principles | ‘Local Decision Making (LDM) aims to fundamentally and positively change the relationship between Aboriginal communities and government, and enable Aboriginal communities to participate fully in decision making concerning service design and delivery.’  Enabled by Premiers Memorandum that states ‘Local Aboriginal communities are given an increasing voice in service delivery and, through LDM regional alliances, will be progressively delegated greater powers and budgetary control as capacity is proven and agreed conditions are met.’ |
| Other notes | LDM seeks to provide regional alliances with an ‘increased say in government service delivery’.  Power may be transferred over time and is conditional and may extend to controlling budgets for some NSW Government services and programs. |
| Reference | Aboriginal Affairs (2017). Local Decision Making. Policy and Operational Framework. May 2017. <https://www.aboriginalaffairs.nsw.gov.au/media/website_pages/working-differently/local-decision-making/about-local-decision-making/LDM-POLICY-AND-OPERATIONAL-FRAMEWORK-JULY-2017.pdf>  Aboriginal Affairs (2017). Local Decision Making. Revised Good Governance Guidelines. September 2017. https://www.aboriginalaffairs.nsw.gov.au/working-differently/local-decision-making/good-governance-guidelines/Revised-Good-Governance-Guidelines-FINAL-INTERIM.pdf  Premiers Memorandum available from https://arp.nsw.gov.au/m2015-01-local-decision-making |

Table 29: Creating Change Through Partnerships (Child and Family Services), SNAICC, Australia

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| --- | --- |
| Name | **Creating Change Through Partnerships – An introductory guide to partnerships between Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander and non-Indigenous organisations in child and family services. SNAICC** |
| Country | Australia |
| Purpose/policy focus | Focus is on partnerships between Indigenous and non-Indigenous organisations in child and family services |
| Principles | ‘Genuine partnerships between Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander organisations and non-Indigenous service providers are important because they can support the creation of an environment in which Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples and communities can work towards self-determination – the collective right of peoples to determine and control their own destiny.’  SNAICC developed a series of partnership principles that form the bedrock of genuine and successful partnerships. (SNAICC, 2020:7):   * Commitment to long term sustainable relationships based on trust * Respect for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander cultures and history * Commitment to self-determination for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples * Aim to improve long-term wellbeing for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children, families and communities * Shared responsibility and accountability for shared objectives and activities * Valuing process elements as integral to support and enable partnership * Redressing unequal or discriminatory relationships, structures and outcomes * Working differently with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children and families   SNAICC also identifies key elements of how to create and sustain genuine inter-agency partnerships   * Core objective * Establish, sustain and review partnerships * Process, governance and accountability; cultural competence; relationships; capacity building (expanded below)   SNAICC also identify four strategies to build and maintain partnerships   * Build your and your organisations cultural competence * Spend time building respectful relationships of trust with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people and communities and their organisations * Listen and learn from Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples to determine how you can support capacity for community-led responses * Establish the processes, governance structures and accountability required for effective and sustainable partnerships |
| Other notes | SNAICC has developed an audit tool to audit partnership arrangements. See <https://www.snaicc.org.au/sector-development/audit-tool-2/?record_id> (accessed 28 February 2023) |
| Reference | SNAICC (2020). Creating Change Through Partnerships: An introductory guide to partnerships between Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander and non-Indigenous organisations in child and family services. Available from <https://www.snaicc.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/1148_SNAICC_PartnershipBook_LR-Final.pdf> (accessed 28 February 2023) |

Table 30: Governance Models for Location Based Initiatives, Australia

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| --- | --- |
| Name | **Governance Models for Location Based Initiatives, Australian Government, Australian Social Inclusion Board** |
| Country | Australia |
| Purpose/policy focus | Focuses on place-based disadvantage and makes a number of recommendations to government about establishing place-based initiatives. |
| Principles | * Understand and reflect the economic context * Coordinate the efforts of all levels of government to identify and coordinate place-based arrangements * Recognise case-by-case nature of structure – but should include a mechanism for coordination of all government services; a community governance mechanism (representative and drives local consultation and engagement, building on existing structures); and resources and authority of government staff to deliver * Identify features of place-based initiative – including responsibility of senior government staff; capacity building to devolve responsibility; identify long-term resources and funding strategies * Build local capacity – including economic and human capital; physical infrastructure; social capital (leadership and governance) * Build government capacity – including giving staff permission, opportunity and support for innovation in funding and accountability, to devolve responsibility to local governance mechanisms; and developing staff skills in community engagement and cultural competency |
| Other notes |  |
| Reference | Australian Social Inclusion Board (20). Governance Models for Local Based Initiatives. |

Table 31: Participation and Co-Creation Standards, Global

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| --- | --- |
| Name | **OGP Participant and Co-Creation Standards and the OGP Participation and Co-Creation Toolkit. (Open Government Partnership)** |
| Country | Global |
| Purpose/policy focus | Toolkit to support Participation and Co-creation standards. Guides through the steps and best practice of participation and co-creation. |
| Principles | Four principles that guide the application of Participation and Co-Creation Standards, based on principles enshrined in the Open Government Declaration – transparency, inclusive participation, accountability and innovation and ambition.  The standards are:   * **Standard 1**: Establishing a space for ongoing dialogue and collaboration between government, civil society and other non-governmental stakeholders. * **Standard 2**: Providing open, accessible and timely information about activities and progress within a member’s participation in OGP. * **Standard 3**: Providing inclusive and informed opportunities for public participation during co-creation of the action plan. * **Standard 4**: Providing a reasoned response and ensuring ongoing dialogue between government and civil society and other non-governmental stakeholders as appropriate during co-creation of the action plan. * **Standard 5**: Providing inclusive and informed opportunities for ongoing dialogue and collaboration during implementation and monitoring of the action plan.   More detail is provided on their website as and in associated guidelines. |
| Other notes |  |
| Reference | <https://www.opengovpartnership.org/ogp-participation-co-creation-standards/>  <https://www.opengovpartnership.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/OGP-Participation-Co-Creation-Toolkit_ARCHIVE.pdf> (accessed 28 February 2023) |

Table 32: Better Together: Principles of Engagement, South Australia

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| Name | Better Together (South Australian Government) |
| Country | South Australia |
| Purpose/policy focus | Establishes principles of engagement (1. Why to engage, 2. Who to engage, 3. Knowing the history, 4. Starting together, 5. Being genuine, 6. Relevant and Engaging)  Level of engagement – use the IAP2 Public Participation Spectrum |
| Principles | Focused on suite of engagement tools rather than co-governance. |
| Other notes | As highlighted by Davis and Andrew (2017:4), the SA Government has removed the ‘empower’ category of engagement, suggesting a political reluctance to engage in ‘power redistribution’ and a preference for focussing on ‘generating capital rather than empowering citizens’. |
| Reference | Better together home page <https://www.bettertogether.sa.gov.au/> (accessed 1 March 2023)  Principles of Engagement handbook <https://www.bettertogether.sa.gov.au/principles-overview/Better-Together-Handbook_sm.pdf>  Engagement plan template <https://www.bettertogether.sa.gov.au/planning-tools/Plan-Engagement-Plan-Template-Updated-July-2018-examples-yrs-only.docx> |

1. See <https://iap2.org.au/resources/spectrum/> (accessed 16 February 2023). [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
2. For example, Health (the Alma Ata Declaration), Disability (UN Convention of the Rights of Persons with Disability; ‘nothing about us without us’, and First Nations (UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples). [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
3. See for example, Bates et al. (2022) for examples of co-governance and collaborative policy design. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
4. See <https://iap2.org.au/resources/spectrum/> (accessed 16 February 2023). [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
5. Note that elsewhere in this paper we refer to empower as ‘devolved decision-making’. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
6. See <https://iap2content.s3-ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/marketing/Resources/Tools+and+Templates/OGP_Participation-CoCreation-Toolkit_20180509.pdf> (accessed 28 February 2023). [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
7. Grootjans, et al. (2022), Che and Hickey, (2021) and Rapp, (2020) all draw on Emerson et al.’s (2012) framework. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
8. Wildlife in the area had been negatively affected by large-scale hydroelectricity development, mining and forestry activities, which affected the local Indigenous communities’ traditional food systems and livelihoods. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
9. 2022 Edelman Trust Barometer. The Trust Index is the average percent trust in NGOs, business, government and media. TRU\_INS. <https://www.edelman.com/sites/g/files/aatuss191/files/2022-01/2022%20Edelman%20Trust%20Barometer%20FINAL_Jan25.pdf> [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
10. See <https://governance.reflowproject.eu/> [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
11. <https://governance.reflowproject.eu/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/RCG-MATRIX-OF-CIRCULAR-COLLABORATION-1.pdf> [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
12. See <https://www.snaicc.org.au/sector-development/audit-tool-2/?record_id> (accessed 28 February 2023). [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
13. For example, Ansell and Gash (2008) reviewed 137 cases of collaborative governance to develop their model of collaborative governance. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
14. By “urban commons” the Bologna Regulation means “the goods, tangible, intangible and digital, that citizens and the Administration, also through participative and deliberative procedures, recognize to be functional to the individual and collective well-being, activating consequently towards them, under article 118, par. 4, of the Italian Constitution to share the responsibility with the Administration of their care or regeneration to improve the collective enjoyment” (Art. 2.a). (Bartoletti and Faccioli, 2020: 1136). [↑](#footnote-ref-15)